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I. INTRODUCTION
I have taught Sexuality and the Law for the past five years, and each year
when I begin the marriage section in that course my students, who as
* Associate Professor of Law, Roger Williams University, School of Law. Ph.D.
(Princeton University); J.D. (Yale Law School); B.A. (Columbia University). I would
like to thank the School of Law at Roger Williams University for providing financial
assistance to complete this project, my research assistant, Arthur DeFelice, and the Ohio
State Law Journal for sponsoring this wonderful symposium. All errors are my own.
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veterans of Constitutional Law are well versed in the right to marry cases,
almost uniformly expect to read Loving v. Virginia. 1 And why should I be
surprised? That canonical marriage case struck down Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute—a marriage prohibition if there ever was one 2 —under
the federal Constitution’s due process and equality guarantees. In so doing,
the Loving Court observed that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men,” 3 and made a simple yet profound statement that
lends itself so beautifully to the marriage equality controversy: that for the
government to distribute the right to marry to some but not to all, “is surely
to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.” 4
Indeed, coupled with the now routine tendency to draw analogies between
race and sexual orientation, 5 as well as with the late Mildred Loving’s
remarks that “all Americans, no matter their race, no matter their sex, no
matter their sexual orientation, should have that same freedom to marry,” 6
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Loving offers an invaluable way for any
teacher, of law or otherwise, to initiate a robust conversation about marriage
equality and about how official discrimination harms everyone, not just those
who are most tangibly affected by it.
All that being said, and despite the very good reasons for doing so, I do
not begin the section on marriage equality in my course with Loving v.
Virginia, even as I do exhaustively cover that foundational case throughout
it. Rather, I rely on a more recent “Virginia” case to frame the conversation
1 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
2 Unlike contemporary exclusionary marriage laws, which simply prohibit same-sex

marriage, anti-miscegenation laws of the sort at issue in Loving v. Virginia both
prohibited and criminalized interracial marriage. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 4–5
(summarizing Virginia’s civil and criminal anti-miscegenation laws).
3 Id. at 12.
4 Id. (emphasis added).
5 See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of
Representation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115, 115 (David
Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998); Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47
UCLA L. REV. 1467, 1484–1503 (2000); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination
Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 202
(1994) (discussing the taboo against homosexuality and the taboo against miscegenation
in analogous terms); Marc S. Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 359, 430–39 (2001) (discussing the race/sexual orientation analogy and its
criticisms).
6 See Mildred Loving, Loving for All: The 40th Anniversary of the Loving v.
Virginia Announcement (June 12, 2007), available at http://www.freedomtomarry.org/
pdfs/mildred_loving-statement.pdf (remarks of Mildred Loving on the fortieth
anniversary of Loving v. Virginia).
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about marriage equality with my students. It is a case that, to my students’
initial puzzlement, did not involve a marriage prohibition (criminal or civil)
at all. Nor, for that matter, did it involve governmental action that implicitly
targets sexual minorities, as marriage prohibitions unarguably do. 7
Instead, that landmark case, United States v. Virginia, involved a form of
sex (rather than sexual orientation) discrimination. 8 I tell my students that it
is well understood that Virginia is an unmistakeable part of the law’s sex
equality canon, in large part because of the “ambitious” account of sex
equality found in that decision’s majority opinion, authored by Justice
Ginsburg 9 —for whom Virginia, according to some commentators, was a
decision that “she had hoped the Court would one day arrive at when she first
started arguing cases of [sex] discrimination in the 1960s.” 10 Far less
understood, I continue, is how that foundational sex equality case might also
constitute an integral part of the law’s sexuality equality canon, as it will in
our class. I tell them, in short, that United States v. Virginia, no less than
Loving v. Virginia, is, or at least should be, an indispensable part of any
examination of what is considered by some to be the “‘gay civil rights’” issue
of our time. 11
To be sure, on a superficial level, the issue in Virginia stands in an
inverse relationship to that of marriage equality. The United States brought
Virginia on behalf of those women who wanted the Virginia Military
Institute (VMI), a state institution which categorically excluded women from

7 See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 2009) (“By purposefully

placing civil marriage outside the realistic reach of gay and lesbian individuals, the ban
on same-sex civil marriages differentiates implicitly on the basis of sexual orientation.”).
8 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (holding that the categorical
exclusion of women from a state military institute violated the federal Constitution’s
Equal Protection Clause and that the state’s creation of a separate and unequal school for
women failed to remedy that constitutional violation).
9 Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 74 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Leaving Things
Undecided] (calling Virginia an “ambitious opinion”); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 165 (2001) [hereinafter
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME] (“In several ways, United States v. Virginia was an
ambitious, nonminimalist opinion.”).
10 ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, SAME, DIFFERENT, EQUAL: RETHINKING SINGLE-SEX
SCHOOLING 165 (2003) (remarks of Mark Tushnet, then Dean of the Georgetown
University Law Center).
11 See Keith Richburg, California Ruling Shows Hurdles Remain for Gay Marriage,
WASH. POST, May 27, 2009, at A4 (quoting Evan Wolfson, executive director of
Freedom
to
Marry),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/05/26/AR2009052600363 html.
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admission since its founding in 1839, 12 to become a mixed-sex institution.
Gay rights organizations, by contrast, are currently bringing marriage
equality cases throughout the United States on behalf of those individuals
who want marriage to become a single-sex institution—in addition to
remaining a cross-sex institution, of course.
These differences aside, the VMI and marriage equality issues share
more than they might appear to at first blush. First, they both concern
institutions, VMI and marriage, respectively, the latter of which the law has
long conceptualized in metaphorical terms as an “institution.” 13 Second, just
as the institution of VMI once did, the institution of marriage makes sex
absolutely relevant, insofar as the question of which couples may enter into
its privileged space depends entirely on what their legal sex is. 14 Third, just
as supporters of VMI’s single-sex requirement argued that VMI’s uniqueness
would be destroyed were it to become mixed sex, 15 so too do supporters of
traditional marriage argue that marriage’s uniqueness will be destroyed were
it to become single sex. 16
12 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 520.
13 See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (“Marriage, as creating the

most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a
people than any other institution, has always been subject to the control of the
legislature.”). For a more recent example, see Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,
798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003) (referring to marriage as an “esteemed institution”).
14 For the argument that exclusionary marriage laws constitute an impermissible
form of sex discrimination, see, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 5, at 14. Only one court to
date has agreed. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (finding that Hawaii’s
opposite-sex marriage law constituted a presumptively unconstitutional form of sex
discrimination under the state constitution and remanding the case to the lower court to
apply heightened scrutiny to that law).
15 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 540 (summarizing the Commonwealth’s claim that
VMI’s unique program would be “destroy[ed]” were it forced to accommodate women as
well as its claim that “[m]en would be deprived of the unique opportunity currently
available to them” should women be admitted into VMI); United States v. Virginia, 766
F. Supp. 1407, 1414 (W.D. Va. 1991) (“It has been established that if VMI were to admit
women, . . . its uniqueness would be lost.”).
16 For courts that have upheld exclusionary marriage laws on the ground that
marriage is either “uniquely” male/female or a “unique” relationship whose traditional
structure the state has a legitimate interest in preserving, see Milberger v. KBHL, LLC,
486 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (D. Haw. 2007) (stating that “special attention to the ‘unique
status’ of marriage underscores the need for additional caution when granting rights
contingent upon marriage to unmarried partners”); In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d
675, 726 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (citing In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 124, 145 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 2004)); Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 732 N.W.2d 139, 150
(Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (“In Michigan, marriage is recognized as inherently a unique
relationship between a man and a woman”) (quotations omitted); Lewis v. Harris, 875
A.2d 259, 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (Parillo, J., concurring); Seymour v.
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Still, more important than the structural and substantive continuities
between the VMI and marriage equality issues is the reasoning that drives
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Virginia, reasoning that might be,
even if it thus far has not been, used as a lens through which to consider what
sexual equality claims in the area of marriage might look like. More
specifically, in the words of Professor Cass Sunstein, Justice Ginsburg’s
“ambitious” 17 majority opinion in Virginia “offer[s] a particular
understanding of sex equality,” 18 one that both acknowledges (indeed,
celebrates) the reality of biological and social differences between the sexes
and maintains that the government cannot rely on such differences to justify
why it is constitutionally permissible to deny equal opportunity to members
of either sex. 19 Put most simply, Justice Ginsburg’s Virginia opinion makes
more than clear that differences between the very individuals whom the
government is treating differently need not defeat, nor be an impediment to,
equality claims under the Constitution.

Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S.2d 858, 864 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (stating that “the Legislature was [not]
irrational in recognizing what is considered a unique and distinct social benefit derived
from heterosexual marriage, to wit: natural procreation and child-rearing”); Andersen v.
King County, 138 P.3d 963, 1002 (Wash. 2006). Uniqueness rationales have also driven
exclusionary marriage amendments. Alabama’s amendment, for instance, which was
passed in June 2006 by a wide margin of 81%, provides that “marriage [i]s ‘inherently a
unique relationship between a man and a woman.’” Bailey v. Faulkner, 940 So. 2d 247,
257 n.11 (Ala. 2006). Likewise, Michigan found that “[a]s a matter of public policy, this
state has a special interest in encouraging, supporting, and protecting that unique
relationship in order to promote, among other goals, the stability and welfare of society
and its children.” Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 732 N.W.2d 139, 148
n.8 (2007) (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 555.1 (2005)). Similarly, Protect Marriage
Arizona, the organization responsible for Arizona’s (unsuccessful) same-sex marriage
initiative in 2006, remarked that the “driving motive and purpose” behind that
amendment was to “protect[] marriage by precluding redefinition of the term ‘marriage’
and by precluding marriage imitations that would undermine the unique status of
marriage.” Response Brief of Real Party in Interest/Appellee at 4, Ariz. Together v.
Brewer, 149 P.3d 742 (Ariz. 2007) (No. CV-06-0277-AP/EL). Even Massachusetts, prior
to the Supreme Judicial Court’s opinion in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health
striking down that jurisdiction’s cross-sex marriage limitation on state constitutional
grounds, proposed an amendment in 2002 the text of which read: “It being the public
policy of this Commonwealth to protect the unique relationship of marriage . . . only the
union of one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in
Massachusetts.” Opinion of the Justices to the Acting Governor, 780 N.E.2d 1232, 1233
n.2 (Mass. 2002).
17 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 165; Sunstein, Leaving Things
Undecided, supra note 9, at 74.
18 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 165.
19 Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 9, at 76–77.
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In ways and for reasons that this Essay will discuss in greater detail
below, however, the rhetoric and the reasoning of marriage equality
arguments tend to de-emphasize, rather than acknowledge, difference, 20 be it
the differences between gays and straights, between same-sex and cross-sex
relationships, or between the families of gays and those of straights. Not only
is this “no-differences” model, as this Essay will later refer to it, both
descriptively inaccurate and normatively undesirable, it is also curious that
advocates for marriage equality continue to rely so heavily on it in light of
the fact that Justice Ginsburg’s celebration of difference reasoning from
Virginia demonstrates that individuals need not be similarly situated to each
other in all respects in order to receive equal treatment and equal opportunity
by the government. While Virginia might be about educational, rather than
marital, opportunity, and about gender, rather than sexual orientation,
discrimination, 21 it offers at least the foundation for a sexual and marriage
equality jurisprudence, one that until now has had little, if any, room to
flourish at least in part because of the kinds of arguments that gay advocates
have made to courts in marriage equality litigation. For this reason, this
Essay submits, United States v. Virginia, and Justice Ginsburg’s theory of
sex equality found therein, should be an integral part of the marriage equality
canon—no less so than the perhaps more immediately relevant Virginia
marriage case that was decided nearly thirty years before it.
This Essay will proceed as follows. Before considering the role that
Virginia could play in shaping marriage equality arguments and marriage
equality jurisprudence, Part II will first examine the no-differences paradigm
that has informed the social, cultural, and legal understanding of same-sex
marriage. To that end, it will provide examples of the way in which (1) the
public has conceptualized gay marriage as but a same-sex version of its
heterosexual counterpart and (2) advocates for marriage equality have tended
to collapse same-sex relationships into their cross-sex counterparts for the
purpose of securing an even-handed distribution of the right to marry by the
government. Part III will then challenge, from a descriptive/factual
20 By “marriage equality arguments” this Essay intends those arguments deployed

by gay rights advocates on behalf of same-sex couple plaintiffs in marriage equality
litigation.
21 At least on its face, as one could argue that Virginia also implicates sexual
orientation. For instance, one of the arguments that the Commonwealth put forth in
support of its exclusionary policy was that VMI’s single-sex environment fulfilled one of
the aims of single-sex colleges more generally, namely, to encourage students “to invest
more energy in academic pursuits . . . because they have few opportunities to dissipate
energy in courtship activities.” United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1435 (W.D.
Va. 1991). Such a statement is predicated on the heterosexual presumption that
“courtship activities” of any variety are not taking place in single-sex educational
environments.
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perspective, the no-differences model that has emerged from the legal,
political, and social controversy over marriage for same-sex couples. More
specifically, this Part will show that that model is descriptively inaccurate
insofar as a number of studies of both same-sex couples and the families that
they share suggest that myriad differences do indeed exist between those
couples/families and their cross-sex counterparts, differences that the nodifferences model either woefully under-represents or completely distorts.
Given the descriptive/factual shortcomings of the no-differences model,
Part IV will suggest that advocates turn to a new model for
sexuality/marriage equality advocacy, one that accepts, if not celebrates,
perceptible differences even while arguing for equal treatment and equal
opportunity. That model, this Part will argue, should look to the vision of
difference on which Justice Ginsburg’s United States v. Virginia majority
opinion in part rests. It will show that Justice Ginsburg’s “ambitious” vision
of difference in Virginia, while largely absent from pro-marriage equality
arguments, is by no means incompatible with the claim that exclusionary
marriage laws violate constitutional equality guarantees. Moreover, this Part
will address the possible reasons why marriage traditionalists have invoked
Justice Ginsburg’s “inherent differences” passage 22 in support of
exclusionary marriage laws, and will challenge their contention that the
author of Virginia, based on her remarks with respect to inherent sex
difference, would support such laws. Indeed, this Essay will submit that, if
anything, Justice Ginsburg’s Virginia opinion should be deployed by
marriage progressives in support of arguments why exclusionary marriage
laws are unconstitutional, rather than the other way around. After setting
forth the no-differences model in Part II, exposing its descriptive/factual
shortcomings in Part III, and offering a new model for sexuality/marriage
equality advocacy and jurisprudence in Part IV, this Essay will finally
consider in Part V the normative value of turning to Justice Ginsburg’s
celebration of difference in Virginia as a way to start thinking about the
importance of difference in the areas of marriage equality and sexuality law
more generally.

II. MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND LIKE-STRAIGHT REASONING/THE NODIFFERENCES MODEL
In 1993, before the marriage equality movement was in full force,
Professor Nancy Polikoff, a self-described “lesbian feminist,” 23 commented
22 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996).
23 Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and

Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every
Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1993).
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that the lesbian and gay community’s “desire to marry” represented “an
attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream society.” 24 Other left-leaning and
progressive academics have echoed these sentiments, noting, for instance,
that the marriage movement has tended to project an image of marriage that
“replicates the heterosexual one, rather than challenging or altering it.” 25
Perhaps less surprisingly, this belief that marriage for same-sex partners
amounts to a form of mimicry has been fully embraced by marriage
traditionalists no less than it has been by those who would likely self-identify
as progressive (albeit for very different reasons); 26 indeed, the rhetorical
24 Id.
25 Suzanna Danuta Walters, Wedding Bells and Baby Carriages: Heterosexuals

Imagine Gay Families, Gay Families Imagine Themselves, in THE USES OF NARRATIVE:
EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND CULTURAL STUDIES 48, 54 (Molly
Andrews et al. eds., 2004). For commentators who have considered the extent to which
current pro-marriage equality rhetoric has come to echo or replicate conservative
marriage idiom and the image of marriage that that idiom projects, see generally Lisa
Duggan, The New Homonormativity: The Sexual Politics of Neoliberalism, in
MATERIALIZING DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A REVITALIZED CULTURAL POLITICS 175, 187–88
(Russ Castronovo & Dana D. Nelson eds., 2002) (stating that the neoliberal marriage
rhetoric championed by Andrew Sullivan and others projects a “role for marriage” that
“sound[s] an awful lot like the dangerous mixture of ‘moral education, psychotherapy
and absolution”’ that has long marked conservative marriage idiom and criticizing
Sullivan in particular for adopting a purely imitative conception of marriage as, in his
words, the “‘mirror image of the happy heterosexuality I imagined around me”’);
Courtney Megan Cahill, “If Sex Offenders Can Marry, Then Why Not Gays and
Lesbians?”: An Essay on the Progressive Comparative Argument, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 777,
777 (2007); Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 246–47 (2006) (stating that “enough of the arguments”
recently deployed by same-sex marriage advocates “echo[] a longing for a kind of
contemporary coverture, whereby one or both previously individuated subjects are
dissolved into a joint legal and economic unit by and through the institution of
marriage”). For an opposing view, see Mae Kuykendall, Resistance to Same-Sex
Marriage as a Story About Language: Linguistic Failure and the Priority of a Living
Language, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 390 (1999) (“Gay marriage speech is sincere
and is not in any rigorous sense ‘mimicry’ of heterosexual marriage speech.”); Evan
Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and
the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 567, 587 (1994)
(“What many gay people do not want is an all-or-nothing model imposed on their lesbian
or gay identity; they want both to be gay and married, to be gay and part of the larger
society. For these lesbians and gay men, being gay is not just about being different, it is
also about being equal. Their deeply-held convictions about how they want to live their
lives and liberation are not mere mimicry. They are entitled to respect within our
community as well as by the state.” (citations omitted)).
26 See generally Courtney Megan Cahill, The Genuine Article: A Subversive
Economic Perspective on the Law’s Procreationist Vision of Marriage, 64 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 393, 416–23 (2007) (summarizing conservative counterfeiting rhetoric).
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claim that marriage for sexual minorities represents a kind of fraud,
counterfeit, or degraded imitation was so common in the political discourse
surrounding marriage for gays and lesbians just a few years back that most
people probably did not think all that much of it. 27 As conservative author,
columnist, and marriage equality opponent, Shelby Steele, remarked not too
long ago: “[t]he true problem with gay marriage is that it consigns gays to a
life of mimicry and pathos.” 28
Aside from the longstanding association between homosexuality and
counterfeit, one that dates back at least to the thirteenth century and without a
doubt to well before that, 29 where did this idea that marriage for same-sex
partners (and for gays and lesbians generally) represents a kind of mimicry or
even parody come from? The following two sections address two possible
reasons why marriage for same-sex couples has been conceptualized as a
kind of mimicry by commentators from all walks of political and social life:
first, the image of same-sex marriage that has been projected in the public
domain by the news media sometimes looks like a same-sex replica of its
heterosexual counterpart (or at least a replica of what the media imagines
heterosexual marriage to look like); and second, the arguments that have
been routinely deployed by gay advocates in marriage equality litigation, and
embraced by some courts, almost uniformly follow what Professor Marc
Spindelman has referred to as a “like-straight” reasoning, one that posits that
gays deserve marriage because they are no different than their straight
counterparts. 30 Indeed, the image of same-sex marriage that has emerged
from both the public imagining of it and the pro-marriage equality discourse
about it partakes of a no-differences model, one that posits a one-to-one
correspondence on nearly every level between gays and straights, between
same-sex and cross-sex relationships, and between the families of gays and
those of straights.

27 See id.
28 Shelby Steele, Selma to San Francisco?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2004, at A16.
29 See Cahill, supra note 26, at 431–36 (discussing the historical antecedents of the

contemporary claim that same-sex relationships are a counterfeit of the real thing).
30 Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1365–66
(2005) [hereinafter Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon] (summarizing the Goodridge
court’s embrace of the like-straight argument that drove gay and lesbian advocates’
litigation strategy in that case); Marc Spindelman, Sodomy Politics in Lawrence v. Texas,
JURIST, June 12, 2003, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=556724 [hereinafter
Spindelman, Sodomy Politics] (summarizing the like-straight arguments that drove
advocates’ litigation strategy in Lawrence v. Texas).
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A. The Public Image of Gay Marriage (or the Ozzie and Ozzie
Phenomenon)
Last April, Benoit Denizet-Lewis wrote a feature article for The New
York Times Magazine entitled Young Gay Rites, a piece whose principal
objective was to answer the following question: Why had so many “[young]
gay men” rushed to the altar, so to speak, in Massachusetts since Goodridge
v. Department of Public Health was decided in 2003—700 to be exact—
when, as the old saw goes, most men, and indeed most young men, have to
be dragged kicking and screaming to that symbolically fraught place? 31
Moreover, what was it about the legal recognition of marriage for same-sex
couples in Massachusetts that made that relationship so attractive and
enticing not just to young men, defined by Denizet-Lewis as aged twentynine and under, but to young gay men—a group that, unlike its
stereotypically cohabitation-obsessed lesbian counterparts, is stereotypically
averse to even a “second date?” 32 Finally, in addition to exploring those
interrelated questions, Young Gay Rites also aimed to capture how gay men
in their twenties, for whom supposedly “no model for how to build a young
gay marriage” existed, would “choose to construct and maintain their
unions.” 33 “What would their marriages look like? And would the
expectation of monogamy, a longstanding cornerstone of heterosexual
marriage, be a requirement for their marriages as well?” Denizet-Lewis
queried. 34
To answer these questions, Denizet-Lewis spent a few months “with a
handful of young married and engaged gay couples,” an extremely limited
sample, by his own admission, since “[a]ll were college-educated and
white.” 35 With respect to the article’s overarching question—why would so
many gay, young, white, college-educated men in their twenties rush to the
altar—Denizet-Lewis mostly tells his readers what that phenomenon, at least
in his view, is not: either a political or social “reaction” to something
(homophobia, for instance) 36 or a “repudiation” of something (including “the
31 Benoit Denizet-Lewis, Young Gay Rites, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 2008, (Magazine),

at 28.
32 This is colloquially known as the “U-haul Syndrome, a long-joked-about

tendency of lesbians to move in together on the second date.” Marcia Munson & Judith P.
Stelboum, Introduction to THE LESBIAN POLYAMORY READER: OPEN RELATIONSHIPS,
NON-MONOGAMY, AND CASUAL SEX, 1, 3 (Marcia Munson & Judith P. Stelboum eds.,
The Haworth Press, Inc. 1999).
33 Denizet-Lewis, supra note 31, at 33.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 35.
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gay world fashioned by previous generations of men—men who reacted to
oppression and homophobia in the ’70s and ’80s by rejecting heterosexual
norms and ‘values,’ particularly around sex and relationships”). 37 Rather, as
Denizet-Lewis relates, the featured couples appeared to be interested in
marriage for many of the same reasons that heterosexual couples often are,
namely, to formalize an emotional bond and “to communicate their love to
each other.” 38
With respect to the other questions posed by Young Gay Rites—What
will the model for those gay marriages be? What will they look like? And
will “monogamy’s law” 39 play as powerful (and repressive) a role in them as
it has in their heterosexual counterparts?—Denizet-Lewis captures a range of
intimate possibilities in the textual portion of his article. One couple, for
instance, “vowed to be monogamous.” 40 Another couple, by contrast, was
quite candid about having an “open” relationship; in one of the spouse’s
words, “We’re open to exploring our sexuality together in a way that makes
us both comfortable.” 41 Indeed, and as reported by Denizet-Lewis,
“[n]egotiating questions surrounding monogamy was a critical issue for most
of the young married and engaged couples” whom he interviewed; in his
words, “for several of the couples I spent time with[], there is no use
pretending they aren’t attracted to other people.” 42 In addition, none of the
couples—again, at least in the textual portion of the article—fell into
stereotypical “male/female” or “husband/wife” roles. Quite the contrary,
“[m]ost of the couples insisted [that] they shared [domestic] responsibilities
in ‘an egalitarian way.’” 43 While one of the spouses “occasionally referred to
himself as a ‘gay housewife,’” 44 other “young gay married men bristled at
the notion that they would fashion their domestic lives around heterosexual

37 Id.
38 Id. at 34. Interestingly, something that Denizet-Lewis neglects to consider is that

perhaps part of the reason why so many young gay men in Massachusetts are seeking to
formalize, or have formalized, their relationships through marriage is because of the
significant amount of privilege and status associated with that social structure, privilege
and status with which the college-educated and “European American” cohort that was the
exclusive focus of Denizet-Lewis’s study would very likely be acquainted. DenizetLewis, supra note 31, at 33.
39 Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsive Monogamy and Polyamorous
Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 277 (2004).
40 Denizet-Lewis, supra note 31, at 34.
41 Id. at 35.
42 Id. (emphasis added).
43 Id.
44 Id.
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stereotypes” 45 —that old “canard” that in all same-sex relationships there
must of necessity be a “man” and a “wife.” 46
What is most fascinating about Denizet-Lewis’s piece, however, is what
appears not in the text of the article but rather in the photos that accompany
it, photos that function simultaneously as an intriguing gloss on, and as a
curious counterpoint to, Denizet-Lewis’s written words. Indeed, if one were
to look just at the photos that attend Young Gay Rites, including The New
York Times Magazine’s front cover photo for that issue, one would likely
expect to read an article that is quite different in substance and in tenor from
the one that Denizet-Lewis actually provides. Whereas Denizet-Lewis
captures a range of possibilities when setting forth what gay marriage might
look like—sometimes non-monogamous, sometimes monogamous,
sometimes non-traditional, sometimes traditional—and whereas his subjects
almost uniformly project an egalitarian image of marriage that is unburdened
by conventional male/female or husband/wife roles, the photos themselves
communicate a strikingly traditional and stereotypically heterosexual image
of that institution. Moreover, whereas Denizet-Lewis provides a fairly
realistic portrayal of marriage between young men, or at least between the
privileged white young men that are featured in his article, the photos are
decidedly idealistic and highly stylized throwbacks to the 1950s, or at least to
what our culture might imagine a 1950s marriage to look like.
For instance, all of the pictures, and most notably the cover photo, have
an air of unreality about them; the subjects, which are stilted and manikinlike, are staged in a tableau that looks more suburbia circa 1955 than it does
contemporary Boston. The cover in particular features a characteristically
“American” scene in saturated colors: the suburban summer barbeque. Two
very handsome, white, and prototypically “American” men with slicked back
hair, full smiles, khaki pants, and collared shirts are pictured barbequing over
a table draped with a red and white-checkered tablecloth in the backyard of a
house in the suburbs on a vibrant summer day. The only text on the cover
page, aside from The New York Times Magazine logo, reads: “The
Newlywed Gays!” 47
If it were not for the fact that the Denizet-Lewis article is not even
remotely critical of the gay marriage movement that it identifies or of the

45 Id.
46 John Cloud, Are Gay Relationships Different?, TIME, Jan. 17, 2008, available at

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1704660,00.html (“Researchers have
long noted that because gender roles are less relevant in gay and lesbian relationships—
it’s a canard that in most gay couples, one partner plays wife—those relationships are
often more equal than heterosexual marriages. Both guys do the dishes; both women grill
the steaks.”).
47 Denizet-Lewis, supra note 31, at cover.
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couples whom it features, one would be inclined to think that the Times was
engaging in satire by staging such a scene and by making such a
proclamation. However, the article is not only uncritical of gay marriage, but
also neutral with respect to the kinds of marital relationships that its subjects
had either entered or were about to enter, even the more traditional same-sex
marriages that tend to replicate what our culture often imagines heterosexual
marriage to look like (i.e., male breadwinner and female homemaker).
Moreover, and as a close friend recently reminded me, The New York Times,
while left leaning, is not exactly The Onion. For that reason, it is highly
unlikely that the photos were intended by the Times’s editors to function as
an independent social/cultural/political indictment of, or as an ironic
commentary on, either marriage between men or marriage as an institution.
The photography that accompanies the article continues this leitmotif of
1950s Ozzie and Harrietesque domestic bliss. Two of the four photos feature
a white married couple, Joshua and Benjamin, the former of whom referred
to himself in the article, perhaps only partially in jest, as a “gay
housewife.” 48 In each photo, Joshua assumes domestic roles stereotypically
associated with women or wives, whereas Benjamin assumes domestic roles
stereotypically associated with men or husbands. In the first photo, which
appears on the first page of the article, Joshua is frolicking around the den
with a vacuum cleaner, brimming with smiles and light on his feet in
slippers, while his husband, Benjamin, throws him a smile from the leather
chair in which he sits, legs crossed, reading a book at the end of a hard day,
dog resting listlessly at his feet. 49 In the second photo, Joshua prepares
dinner—perhaps according to the A Great American Cook cookbook that
appears at the bottom of the frame—with a smile that is part sheepish, part
“Look at what I did, honey!” while his husband, slightly taller, watches with
a look of proud approval, his arm draped firmly around Joshua’s shoulder. 50
Of the other two photos that accompany the piece, one features an
engaged couple, Marc and Vassili, in what appears to be a very traditional
wedding photo, with one spouse standing and the other sitting in a chair even
as both don tuxedos and boutonnieres. 51 The other photo, an outlier of sorts
in this tableau of (admittedly strained) domestic bliss, is of Aaron, a gay
twenty-six-year-old recently divorced from another man. Curiously, the
article itself portrays Aaron as a cheerful enough divorcee who has certainly
moved on: Denizet-Lewis meets Aaron at a party that the latter attends with a

48 Id. at 35.
49 Id. at 28–29.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 31.
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new boyfriend. 52 The photo, however, depicts Aaron eating alone at a dining
room table, blank-eyed and staring vacantly into space as he eats what
appears to be a rather pathetic and paltry bowl of tomato soup. 53 While on
one level the photo of Aaron is quite unlike the other photos, on another level
it is of a piece with them, as the misery of divorce portrayed in it is no less
stylized than was the bliss of marriage that preceded it.
Cognitive linguist, George Lakoff, might say that the visual tableaus of
connubial bliss that go along with the Denizet-Lewis piece have the effect of
“framing” the way that we conceptualize gay marriage. 54 Under this view,
visual media, no less than words, have the tremendous power not only of
capturing how individuals might already think about marriage between samesex partners, but also of influencing and changing how they think about that
relationship moving forward. 55 Even though Denizet-Lewis offers a fairly
nuanced portrayal of what a marriage between two young men might look
like, the photos that accompany his piece both reflect and reproduce
hackneyed stereotypes about marriage—and, interestingly enough,
hackneyed stereotypes about heterosexual marriage rather than about gay
marriage. Indeed, the visual imagery that the Times deploys to frame and
represent marriage between men is striking for two reasons: first, because it
evokes an image of marriage that no longer exists—if, indeed, it ever existed
at all; and second, because it suggests that marriage between members of the
same sex can only be conceptualized, and thereby understood, through a
heterosexual lens, as something that is like traditional cross-sex marriage in
all ways save for the fact that it is not, in fact, a cross-sex relationship.
First, and as mentioned above, the imagery that accompanies Young Gay
Rites is striking because it idealizes or romanticizes a time, the 1950s, that
was not particularly hospitable to gays and lesbians (indeed, far from it). 56 In
52 Id. at 60.
53 Denizet-Lewis, supra note 31, at 32.
54 According to Lakoff, “[f]rames are the mental structures that allow human beings

to understand reality—and sometimes to create what we take to be reality.” Moreover,
frames “facilitate our most basic interactions with the world—they structure our ideas
and concepts, they shape the way we reason, and they even impact how we perceive and
how we act.” GEORGE LAKOFF, THINKING POINTS: COMMUNICATING OUR AMERICAN
VALUES AND VISION 25 (2006) [hereinafter LAKOFF, THINKING POINTS]; see also GEORGE
LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE:
THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR PROGRESSIVES (2004); GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS
(2002).
55 See LAKOFF, THINKING POINTS, supra note 54, at 26.
56 See, e.g., JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING
OF A HOMOSEXUALITY MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940–1970 40 (1983)
(summarizing how “[t]he Cold War and its attendant domestic anticommunism provided
the setting in which a sustained attack upon homosexuals and lesbians took place”);
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a letter to the editor, for instance, one reader of the article expressed her
disbelief that the Times chose a 1950s leitmotif for a piece about
contemporary marriage for sexual minorities when history had clearly shown
that the 1950s were not “especially welcoming to gays and lesbians.” 57
Moreover, the imagery idealizes or romanticizes a time which, according to
some historians, never truly existed according to that idealized or
romanticized vision in the first place.
For instance, historian of the family, Professor Stephanie Coontz, has
argued that “[l]ike most visions of a ‘golden age,’ the ‘traditional
family’ . . . evaporates on closer examination. It is an ahistorical amalgam of
structures, values, and behaviors that never coexisted in the same time and
place.” 58 With respect to the whitewashed image of the 1950s family in
particular, Coontz writes: “The happy, homogeneous families that we
‘remember’ from the 1950s were . . . partly a result of the media’s denial of
diversity.” 59 Moreover, “[t]he reality of these families was far more painful
and complex than the situation-comedy reruns or the expurgated memories of
the nostalgic would suggest.” 60 “Contrary to popular opinion,” she
continues, “‘Leave it to Beaver’ was not a documentary.” 61 To be sure, the
Times’s invocation of a 1950s family form is especially perplexing
considering that homosexuality was thought to pose a threat to that very form
at that very time, as 1950s political rhetoric routinely linked together
homosexuality, “deviant family or sexual behavior,” sedition, and
communism. 62
Second, and more pertinent here, the imagery that accompanies Young
Gay Rites is striking because it strongly suggests that marriage between
same-sex partners (or at least between two men) is naturally viewed through
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET
(1998); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion,
Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106
YALE L.J. 2411, 2424–25 (1997) (discussing the “antihomosexual Kulturkampf of the
1950s”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the Apartheid of the
Closet, 1946–1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 703, 708 (1997).
57 Letters, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2008, (Magazine), at 6.
58 STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE
NOSTALGIA TRAP 9 (1992).
59 Id. at 31.
60 Id. at 29.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 33; see also D’EMILIO, supra note 56, at 41 (“As the anticommunist wave in
American politics rose, it carried homosexuals with it.”); see also id. at 43 (stating that
“[t]he homosexual menace continued as a theme of American political culture throughout
the McCarthy era” and that “[r]ight-wing organizations combined their attacks on
communists with calls for the ejection of homosexuals from government”).
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an idealized and romanticized heterosexual lens. As described above, the
cover photo depicts two men having a summer barbecue. Not only is the
family barbecue an iconic image of the 1950s heterosexual family, 63 but
barbecuing itself has long been considered to be one of those things that the
man of the house—and, in particular, the heterosexual man of the house—
uniquely does. Several commentators, for instance, have noted that “there is
a masculine overtone to the [barbecue] grill” 64 and that barbecuing falls
within the “prototypically male realm,” one that also includes “car repairs”
and “sports.” 65 Moreover, Professor Melissa Murray, who has recently
provided a nuanced and thorough interpretation of the “Yes on 8”
movement’s media strategy in California prior to the passage of Proposition
8, 66 observes that one of the “Yes on 8” television advertisements
predictably concluded with a “post-election barbecue,” one where Tom, the
heterosexual husband character, “man[ned] the grill” (no pun likely
intended). 67 Along with the iconic barbecue, Murray observes, the ads
invoked other familiar images that dealt with traditional gender roles within
marriage; 68 their collective objective, she argues, was to “appeal[ ] to gender
traditionalists with subtle visual cues.” 69 Fascinatingly, then, the image of
marriage that opens up an article whose aim, in part, is to investigate just
what marriage between two men will look like 70 replicates the image of
marriage that concludes an ad whose aim, in part, is to present to the public

63 See COONTZ, supra note 58, at 31 (stating that “suburban ranch houses and family
barbecues were the carrots offered to white middle class families that adopted the new
norms” of the 1950s).
64 See Jennifer Lee, The Man Date: What Do You Call Two Straight Men Having
Dinner?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2005, § 9, at 2.
65 Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1211 (1990); see also
Nancy D. Polikoff, Lesbian and Gay Parenting: The Last Thirty Years, 66 MONT. L. REV.
51, 60 (2005) (stating that the barbecue has been “traditionally associated with the male
role”).
66 Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights: Parents, the State, and
Proposition 8, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. (forthcoming 2009).
67 Id. at 25–26.
68 Id. at 26.
69 Id. at 24.
70 At the outset of Young Gay Rites, Denizet-Lewis queries: “What would [the]
marriages [between the young gay men whom he interviewed] look like? And would the
expectation of monogamy, a longstanding cornerstone of heterosexual marriage, be a
requirement for their marriages as well?” Denizet-Lewis, supra note 31, at 33.
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the dangers of abandoning the traditional, and traditionally gendered,
definition of marriage. 71
As noted above, the 1950s-style barbecue that frames “Young Gay Rites”
is just one of the many stereotypically gendered images that appear in that
article. It is probably no surprise, then, that for some readers there was a
troubling disjuncture between what Denizet-Lewis was actually saying in his
article and what the Times was attempting to capture in the photography that
accompanied it. In the words of the same reader who was quoted above:
I enjoyed Denizet-Lewis’s article. He created a lively and sympathetic read,
chronicling the path to marriage and beyond, a path that is not so different
for couples of any sexual orientation. But why the colorized, exaggerated
photos, mimicking the most clichéd and self-conscious of coupled
moments? Why pose Marc and Vassili in tuxedos when they specifically
stated that they will sidestep all the trappings associated with ‘traditional’
weddings? Besides the uncomfortable nod to the ’50s (an era that was not
especially welcoming to gays and lesbians), it suggests that gay couples are
somehow ‘play acting’ at being married. As a civil celebrant, who has had
the great joy to preside over many gay unions in New Jersey, I was
offended by the way these couples were depicted, at least visually. 72

To add to this reader’s already incisive remarks—remarks that echo
those of progressive commentators who have faulted the marriage equality
movement for projecting an image of marriage that “replicates the
heterosexual one, rather than challenging or altering it” 73 —one wonders why
the Times never included a photo of the “two Brandons,” the two engaged
young men whose story occupied a sizeable chunk of the article and who
evaded the trappings of tradition more than any of the other couples featured
in Young Gay Rites. That is, among the couples whom Denizet-Lewis
interviewed for that piece, the Brandons were the most willing to embrace
the prospect of non-monogamy 74 and the quickest to recognize the
“heteronormative” aspects of “traditional . . . married culture.” 75 Perhaps it is
for precisely those reasons that the Brandons had no role in the photography
that accompanied the Denizet-Lewis article, photography that was insistent
on transposing a(n idealistic) model of heterosexual marriage onto gay
marriage, on viewing marriage between two men through an exclusively
heterosexual lens, and on adhering to a no-differences model that

71 See Murray, supra note 66, at 26.
72 Letters, supra note 57, at 6.
73 See Danuta Walters, supra note 25, at 54.
74 Denizet-Lewis, supra note 31, at 34.
75 Id.
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conceptualizes marriage between same-sex partners as but a same-sex
version of its cross-sex counterpart. While beyond the scope of this Essay, it
is worth mentioning that The New York Times Magazine’s pictorial treatment
of alternative family structures exhibits a pattern of adhering to this nodifferences model; the cover photo for an earlier feature article in the
Magazine, which considered how gays and lesbians have families of their
own, also represents the family of two lesbians, two gay men, and the
children that one of the women had with one of the men as one that
approximates a heterosexual paradigm. 76 Interestingly, and as the next
Section will now discuss in greater detail, this no-differences model has
influenced legal arguments in the movement in favor of gay marriage no less
than it has visual renderings of that relationship in such leading media outlets
as The New York Times.

B. Gay Advocacy and Like-Straight Reasoning/The No-Differences
Model
The domestic/marital tableaus that accompany a high profile piece such
as Young Gay Rites vividly and visually mirror a larger phenomenon in the
marriage equality movement, namely, the tendency to rely on a litigation
strategy that posits that same-sex couples, and the families that they share,
are just like cross-sex couples in all ways with respect to the right to marry.
Professor Marc Spindelman has referred to this line of argumentation as
“like-straight” reasoning, defined in greater detail below, and has
demonstrated the extent to which that sort of reasoning has driven gay rights
litigation strategies across a range of substantive areas, from the sexual
autonomy cases (Lawrence v. Texas) 77 to the marriage equality cases
(Goodridge v. Department of Public Health). 78 That like-straight reasoning,
or the invocation of a no-differences model, has become a stock feature of
gay rights litigation is clear upon a survey of the arguments that have been
deployed in that litigation. In addition, it is no surprise that like-straight/nodifferences arguments are such a familiar feature of gay rights litigation, as
they make a great deal of sense for a number of doctrinal and strategic
reasons.
Before considering those reasons, however, it is first useful to define
like-straight reasoning/the no-differences model and to survey in brief how it
has driven the arguments that gay rights organizations have made in litigation
dealing with substantive areas such as sexual autonomy and marriage for
76 John Bowe, Gay Donor or Gay Dad?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2006, (Magazine), at

66–67.
77 Spindelman, Sodomy Politics, supra note 30, at 2.
78 See Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, supra note 30, at 1365.
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same-sex partners. Spindelman, who criticizes like-straight arguments largely
for reasons other than those suggested here, 79 defines those arguments
simply as the claim that “[l]esbians and gay men are just like
heterosexuals.” 80 For that reason, the argument goes, “lesbians and gay men
deserve the same rights and privileges heterosexuals receive, including the
right to marry, and for just the same reasons.” 81 Under this view, sameness
between gays and straights is a necessary precondition for equal or
symmetrical legal treatment; like-straight logic, in other words, “reinforc[es]
the abstract logic that to be equal one must be the same” 82 (the same logic, it
turns out, and as Part IV will show, that Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion
in Virginia at least partially disrupts vis-à-vis sex equality). Both
“seductively simple” 83 and “remarkably uncomplicated,” 84 the proposition
that gays are just like heterosexuals and should therefore be treated the same,
Spindelman observes, is a nice way to “unite” the independent doctrinal
claims that advocates for gay rights commonly deploy in gay rights
litigation. 85
79 For instance, Spindelman has argued that like-straight reasoning, which rests on
“formal equality logic,” grants “rights only on the terms that the socially privileged [i.e.,
heterosexuals] have set . . . . As legal theorist Catharine MacKinnon has observed:
concealed in this approach ‘is the substantive way in which man has become the measure
of all things.’ And this man has, substantively, been heterosexual.” Sodomy Politics,
supra note 30, at 3. In addition, like-straight arguments “reinforc[e] the abstract logic that
to be equal one must be the same.” Id. Most problematic for Spindelman, however, is the
power of like-straight arguments (1) to “embrace and advance the idea that
heterosexuality (at least at its core) is all good, all happy,” when, in fact, “[a]s feminism
has shown, the institution of heterosexuality has hardly been so egalitarian,” id., and (2)
to elide the reality of sexual violence in cross-sex and same-sex relationships alike. Likestraight reasoning, under this view, tends to “regard any victory for sex as sweet, even
when the sex that prevails is (or includes) sexual viol[ence].” Id. at 5. See also
Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, supra note 30, at 1375 (stating that the likestraight reasoning that drove the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’ opinion in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health exhibited an “uncritical solicitude for
marriage and the way it has been heteronormatively structured and defined”).
80 Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, supra note 30, at 1365.
81 Id.
82 Spindelman, Sodomy Politics, supra note 30, at 3.
83 Id. at 2.
84 Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, supra note 30, at 1365.
85 See Spindelman, Sodomy Politics, supra note 30, at 2 (stating that attorneys in
Lawrence v. Texas made both privacy and equality claims in that case, and that “what
unite[d] these . . . claims . . . [was] a seductively simple proposition: gays are just like
heterosexuals”); Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, supra note 30, at 1365 (stating
that “[f]ollowing a pattern visible and (at last) successful in other recent lesbian and gays
rights litigation efforts, lawyers for the lesbian and gay plaintiffs in Goodridge argued for
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Even just a brief survey of the sorts of arguments that were made to the
United States Supreme Court in Lawrence, and that have been made to
various state supreme courts in marriage equality litigation, reveals how
widespread like-straight reasoning/the no-differences model really is. For
instance, and as Spindelman points out, the Law Professors’ Brief that was
filed in Lawrence highlighted what in its view was a multitude of similarities
between gays and straights. In his words:
Just in case anyone (or anyone who happens to sit on the Supreme Court)
should be unaware of the breezy similarities between homosexuals and
heterosexuals, the Law Professors’ Brief details some of the ways that “gay
people,” just like heterosexuals, “form couples and create families that
engage in the full range of everyday activities, from the most mundane to
the most profound.” Gay people, for example, “shop, cook, and eat
together.” Who knew? They “celebrate the holidays together, and share one
another’s families.” And they even “make financial and medical decisions
for one another[,]” and “rely on each other for companionship and support.”
In sum, “[m]any gay couples share ‘the duties and the satisfactions of a
common home.’” In these and other ways, the Law Professors’ Brief
affirms, as do many other gay rights briefs in Lawrence, that homosexuals
are just like heterosexuals and, consequently, deserve all the same rights
and privileges that heterosexuals have. Guess what: We’re human. 86

Similarly, the briefs that have been filed by advocates in gay rights
litigation, and particularly in marriage equality litigation, overwhelmingly
have adopted like-straight reasoning/the no-differences model. For instance,
advocates have argued that “[s]ame-sex committed relationships deserve to
be honored with the same rights and responsibilities that are granted to
heterosexual couples,” 87 that “just as heterosexual relationships arise from
existing social and religious practices, so too do the relationships
of . . . same-sex couples . . . who are responsible, contributing members of
their communities,” 88 and that “lesbian and gay couples often have stable,
committed, and enduring relationships that play the same central role in their

same-sex marriage rights on both liberty and equality grounds. Broadly uniting these
formally distinct doctrinal claims was a remarkably uncomplicated proposition: Lesbians
and gay men are just like heterosexuals”).
86 Spindelman, Sodomy Politics, supra note 30, at 3.
87 Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights Campaign et al. in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants at 6, Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (No. A002244-O3T5).
88 Respondents’ Answer to Amici Curiae Briefs at 23, Woo v. California, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 675 (Ct. App. 2006) (No. A110451) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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lives as they do for heterosexuals.” 89 More recently, and in response to the
traditionalist marriage argument that same-sex couples can be denied the
right to marry because same-sex, or “genderless,” marriage is a sub-optimal
environment in which to have and raise children, 90 gay advocates have
argued that lesbian and gay couples “can provide stable family environments
just as heterosexuals can,” 91 that “children raised by gay and lesbian parents
are as likely to be well-adjusted as children raised by heterosexual
parents,” 92 and that “[n]umerous studies of children raised by gay and
lesbian parents conducted over the past 25 years . . . show that children raised
by lesbian and gay parents are as successful as children raised by
heterosexual parents.” 93
As mentioned above, the deployment of like-straight arguments in gay
rights advocacy, whether in the area of sexual autonomy or that of marriage,
makes sense on both a doctrinal and a strategic level. First, like-straight
reasoning, or the no-differences model, makes sense from a doctrinal
perspective in part because of the formal equality principle on which federal
and state constitutional equality guarantees rest. According to that principle
and its antecedent philosophical tradition, similarly-situated individuals, and
like cases, must be treated alike. 94 To do otherwise, of course, would be to
violate those federal and/or state constitutional equality guarantees.
89 Appellants’ Abstract, Brief, and Addendum at 429, Dep’t of Human Servs. v.
Howard, 238 S.W.3d (Ark. 2006) (No. 05-814).
90 For the use of the term “genderless marriage” to refer to a marriage between
members of the same sex, see Monte Neil Stewart, Genderless Marriage, Institutional
Realities, and Judicial Elision, 1 DUKE J. OF CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 4–6, 20–24
(2006); Monte Neil Stewart, Judicial Redefinition of Marriage, 21 CAN. J. FAM. L. 11,
85–95 (2004). For additional arguments that marriage should be exclusively cross-sex for
reasons relating to both procreation and child development, see Lynn D. Wardle,
“Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in
Marriage Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771, 799–802 (2001); Lynn D.
Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L.
REV. 833.
91 Appellants’ Abstract, Brief, and Addendum, supra note 89, at 429–30.
92 Final Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 40, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862
(Iowa 2008) (No. 07-1499).
93 Id. at 40 n.33.
94 See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (“[The Equal Protection
Clause] embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases alike but may treat
unlike cases accordingly.”); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
439 (1985) (“The Equal Protection Clause ... is essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike.”). The ‘like-cases should be treated alike’ idea
derives from Aristotle’s discussion of justice in the Nicomachean Ethics. THE ETHICS OF
ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V, 1131a25 (J.A.K. Thomson trans.,
1976). For a discussion of the law’s implementation of the formal equality principle, see
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Unsurprisingly, those who oppose extending marriage rights to same-sex
couples have tried to argue that, in their view, exclusionary marriage laws do
not violate constitutional equality guarantees precisely because same-sex
couples are dissimilarly situated from cross-sex couples in all sorts of
relevant ways when it comes to marriage, including the ways that the former
both have and raise children. For instance, in California’s marriage equality
case, In re Marriage Cases, 95 one defendant made an unsuccessful threshold
argument that the California constitution’s equality guarantees did not even
apply to the state’s cross-sex marriage restriction because “same-sex couples
and opposite-sex couples are not ‘similarly situated’ with regard to the
challenged statute’s legitimate purpose.” 96 Similarly, in Iowa’s recent
marriage equality case, Varnum v. Brien, 97 the government tried to argue,
again unsuccessfully, that the “[same-sex couple] plaintiffs are not similarly
situated to opposite-sex couples so as to necessitate further equal protection
analysis because the plaintiffs cannot ‘procreate naturally.’” 98
Whether marriage equality opponents argue that equal protection does
not even apply because same-sex and cross-sex couples are so differently
situated, or that the differences between same-sex and cross-sex couples in
areas such as procreation and the family serve as legitimate reasons for
differential treatment, the idea is the same: it does not violate constitutional
equality guarantees to prohibit same-sex couples from marrying each other
because they are different from those who already do enjoy that right. In light
of the formal equality principle that underlies constitutional guarantees of
equal protection, then, and in light of marriage traditionalists’ attempt to
rebut the application of that principle to marriage prohibitions, it makes
perfect doctrinal sense that marriage equality advocates would want to
emphasize just how similarly situated same-sex couples are to their cross-sex
generally Robin West, The Missing Jurisprudence of the Legislated Constitution, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020 79, 84 (Balkin & Siegel eds., 2009) (“Formal equality is the
jurisprudential ideal at the heart of the meaning of adjudicative law. Treating likes alike
is what judges do when they are doing their jobs morally and doing them well.”); Cass R.
Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 745 (1993) (describing
analogical reasoning as a situation where “[t]he law treats A in a certain way” and
“[b]ecause B shares certain characteristics with A, the law should treat B the same way”);
Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV.
341, 344 (1949); Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1974).
95 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional
amendment, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5, as recognized in, Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th
364 (2009).
96 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435 n.54 (summarizing this argument).
97 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
98 Id. at 882.
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counterparts when it comes to marriage. The more advocates can convince
courts that the former are just like the latter, at least when it comes to such
things as marriage and the family, the more likely those courts will find that
marriage prohibitions violate constitutional equality guarantees and the
equality principle on which they rest.
In addition, gay advocates’ invocation of a no-differences model also
makes doctrinal sense from the perspective of determining which level of
review should apply to marriage restrictions in the first instance. A
significant issue to be litigated before state supreme courts in marriage
equality litigation has been which level of judicial review should apply to
marriage restrictions that are being subject to state constitutional equal
protection challenges. Predictably, in those cases marriage equality advocates
have argued that heightened scrutiny should apply to those restrictions
because gays and lesbians constitute a suspect class and because sexual
orientation constitutes a suspect classification. 99 To make that argument,
advocates have variously reasoned that gays and lesbians (1) have been
subject to a history of discrimination, (2) have immutable characteristics, (3)
have been (or are) politically powerless, and (4) are being discriminated on
the basis of a trait, sexual orientation, that bears no relationship to a person’s
ability to perform or contribute to society. With respect to the fourth factor,
the United States Supreme Court has explained that whether a characteristic
is irrelevant to a person’s ability to contribute to society should be used by
courts when determining, for equal protection purposes, whether any given
characteristic is suspect/quasi-suspect or non-suspect. The more irrelevant a
characteristic is, the more suspect it is, and vice versa. 100

99 See, e.g., Memorandum of Authorities in Support of All Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Summary Judgment and in Support of All Plaintiffs’ Resistance to Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment at 57–63, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (No.
CV5965) [hereinafter Memorandum of Authorities]; Respondents’ Opening Brief on the
Merits at 26–39, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147999). Of
course, advocates have also argued in the alternative that even if sexual orientation does
not constitute a suspect class, exclusionary marriage laws are still unconstitutional
because they fail to satisfy even rational basis review. See, e.g., Memorandum of
Authorities at 76 (“Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their equal protection
and due process claims . . . even if rational basis review applies.”).
100 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(stating that race, national origin, and alienage “are so seldom relevant to the
achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy”); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686–
87 (1973) (stating that because “the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to
ability to perform or contribute to society . . . statutory distinctions between the sexes
often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal
status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members”).

966

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:4

In light of the is-the-classification-irrelevant factor for determining its
status under constitutional equality guarantees, it is of little surprise that
marriage equality advocates have minimized any possible differences
between the sexual majority and the sexual minority. Indeed, it would seem
that advocates would have to downplay any differences whatsoever, good
and bad alike, between the sexual majority and the sexual minority in order
to make the best possible case that gays and lesbians are a suspect class
insofar as their sexual orientation never matters, that is, never affects how
they contribute to society, whether that contribution be positive or negative.
In other words, it is not only that marriage prohibitions are unconstitutional
because no legitimate distinctions exist between gays and straights when it
comes to marriage and the family. It is also that equal protection doctrine
more generally compels advocates to argue that one’s minority sexual
orientation status, like one’s race and gender status, should never be relevant.
The less relevant that a trait is, the less likely that the government will be
able to classify on the basis of it without running afoul of constitutional
equality protections.
Second, and relatedly, like-straight reasoning makes strategic sense
because it has enjoyed success in the courts, some of which have struck
down legislation that burdens sexual minorities by invoking the equal
protection principle, by downplaying the distinctiveness (and thereby the
relevance) of one’s sexual minority status, and by adverting to the nodifferences model. The Lawrence v. Texas majority, for instance, relied on a
kind of like-straight reasoning when it stated that “[p]ersons in a homosexual
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes”—“purposes,” the prior
paragraph suggests, “relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education”—“just as heterosexual persons
do.” 101 The proposition that gays are just like heterosexuals when it comes to
sexual, reproductive, and even perhaps marital autonomy was one that the
Bowers v. Hardwick majority roundly dismissed as preposterous seventeen
years earlier, when it emphasized that “[n]o connection between family,
marriage, or procreation, on the one hand, and homosexual activity, on the
other,” existed for constitutional purposes. 102

101 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (emphasis added).
102 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986); see also Spindelman,

Homosexuality’s Horizon, supra note 30, at 1375–76 (stating that in Bowers, “Justice
Byron White deemed ‘facetious’ the suggestion that same-sex sexual intimacies deserved
protection on a par with decisions involving marriage, family, and procreation. From his
perspective, the differential treatment made perfect sense: Same-sex sexual intimacies
bore no relation to those obvious public goods to which they were being likened.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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Just a few months after Lawrence was decided, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts wholeheartedly embraced the no-differences model
in Goodridge, in which a bare majority of the court ruled that Massachusetts’
cross-sex marriage definition violated state constitutional liberty and equality
guarantees. 103 As Spindelman observes, “‘[l]ike-straight’ reasoning drives
Marshall’s Goodridge opinion start to end,” 104 as the majority there
champions “a definition of marriage that has built into it the idea that
lesbians and gay men, hence their relations, are just like heterosexuals, and
theirs.” 105
“Exchanging the classic definition’s presumption that
heterosexuality and homosexuality are unalike for one that implicitly negates
it,” he continues, “Goodridge declares the institution of marriage is
fundamentally about relationships.” 106
Most recently, in Varnum, the Iowa Supreme Court consistently relied on
like-straight reasoning when explaining why that state’s cross-sex marriage
definition violated state constitutional equality guarantees. 107 At the very
beginning of its unanimous opinion, for example, the court made clear just
how similarly situated gay and straight Iowans were when it came to
marriage, stating, “[l]ike most Iowans, they are responsible, caring, and
productive individuals . . . . Like many Iowans, some have children and
others hope to have children . . . . Like all Iowans, they prize their liberties
and live within the borders of this state with the expectation that their rights
will be maintained and protected.” 108
The remainder of the Varnum court’s opinion continues this likestraight/no-differences theme. In response to the argument that gays could be
denied the right to marry because they allegedly make sub-optimal parents,
for
instance,
the
court
reasoned
that
“[m]any
leading
organizations, . . . supported the conclusion that gay and lesbian parents are
as effective as heterosexual parents in raising children” 109 and that “[l]esbian
and gay parents are as likely as heterosexual parents to provide supportive
and healthy environments for children.” 110 Moreover, the court variously
observed that “[p]laintiffs are in committed and loving relationships, many
raising families, just like heterosexual couples,” 111 that “official recognition
103 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003).
104 Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, supra note 30, at 1366.
105 Id. at 1367.
106 Id.
107 See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009).
108 Id. at 872 (emphasis added).
109 Id. at 874 (emphasis added).
110 Id. (emphasis added).
111 Id. at 883 (emphasis added).
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of their status provides an institutional basis for defining their fundamental
relational rights and responsibilities, just as it does for heterosexual
couples,” 112 and that “for purposes of Iowa’s marriage laws, . . . plaintiffs are
similarly situated in every important respect [to heterosexual couples], but
for their sexual orientation.” 113 Finally, the Varnum court agreed with the
plaintiffs that sexual orientation constituted something more than a nonsuspect class, given that sexual orientation—and, in particular, one’s
minority sexual orientation status—was not relevant to one’s ability to
contribute to society in any distinctive way. 114

C. Moving Beyond Like-Straight Reasoning/The No-Differences Model
Simply because like-straight reasoning/the no-differences model makes
sense on a doctrinal and strategic level, however, does not necessarily mean
that it is either descriptively accurate or normatively desirable. To be sure, it
is of course true that gays are like straights in many significant ways that
merit both exposure in the public realm (in prominent media outlets such as
The New York Times) and serious consideration by courts. Many gays, like
many straights, want to enter into long-term, committed relationships. Many
gays, like many straights, want to structure those relationships according to
conventional roles, with one breadwinner and one homemaker. Many gays,
like many straights, desire to have and to raise families, whether biological or
not. And many gays, like many straights, want the protections of the law—
protections that, unfortunately, are largely available only to those who
choose to seek legal recognition of their relationship in the form of marital,
domestic partnership, or civil union status.
The point here, however, is that neither gays, nor the intimate
relationships that they form with each other, are just like straights and their
intimate relationships—just like them in all the ways that visual media and
litigation arguments suggest that they are. Moreover, and from a more
normative standpoint, gay advocates should not have to argue that same-sex
relationships are just like their cross-sex counterparts in all significant ways
when it comes to marriage and the family in order to secure an even-handed
distribution of the right to marry, especially when studies suggest that many
same-sex couples and their families are different in some rather important
ways from many cross-sex couples and their families. 115 Cognizable
112 Id. (emphasis added).
113 Varnum, 763 N.W.2d. at 883–84 (emphasis added).
114 Id. at 890–93. The Varnum court applied the four factors set forth above and

found that sexual orientation constituted a quasi-suspect classification deserving of
heightened judicial review. See id. at 896.
115 See infra discussion at Part III.
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differences, this Essay submits, need not defeat equality claims, even as they
have taken a backseat to a no-differences model and its strict formal equality
logic.
While not inherently bad, the ideas that gays are just like straights or that
same-sex couples are just like cross-sex couples that are expressed in both
visual depictions of same-sex marriage and legal arguments made to courts
are woefully incomplete and therefore warrants reconsideration. As the next
Part will show, abundant research suggests that significant differences
between gay and straight relationships exist, differences that get downplayed
in marriage equality litigation out of a fear that the mere admission of any
difference between same-sex and cross-sex couples would signal the death
knell to a constitutional challenge of an exclusionary marriage law for the
reasons suggested above. Moreover, not only do empirical studies exist that
suggest that same-sex and cross-sex relationships are different in important
ways that go unmentioned, but so too does a legal model for incorporating
the reality of that difference into a constitutional challenge. That model, as
mentioned earlier, is Justice Ginsburg’s United States v. Virginia majority
opinion, one that boldly recognizes the reality of difference as well as the
fact that such difference cannot justify unequal treatment. It is a model, this
Essay will suggest, on which a new sexuality/marriage equality advocacy and
jurisprudence could, and indeed should, rest.

III. THE DESCRIPTIVE SHORTCOMINGS OF LIKE-STRAIGHT
REASONING/THE NO-DIFFERENCES MODEL
Even though the no-differences model has shaped the way in which the
public sometimes views same-sex marriage as well as the way in which gay
advocates routinely cast their arguments in marriage equality litigation, a
wealth of sociological and psychological research exists that casts doubt on
that model. These studies, which thus far have not made their way into promarriage equality briefs for reasons offered below, suggest that significant
differences exist between same-sex and cross-sex couples across a range of
areas, from interpersonal interactions to parenting, the latter of which, as
discussed earlier, has played a prominent role in arguments against marriage
equality. Insofar as these studies acknowledge difference on myriad levels,
they pose a serious challenge to the progressive no-differences model and to
the narrow vision of equality that it produces.
Perhaps the most controversial study to date disputing the no-differences
model was published in 2001 by sociologists Judith Stacey and Timothy
Biblarz. 116 In that study, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents
116 Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of

Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159 (2001).
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Matter?, Professors Stacey and Biblarz challenge what they refer to as the
“‘no differences’ doctrine” that has come to dominate comparative research
on lesbian and gay family issues. 117 The authors explain that most empirical
research on lesbian and gay family life that is sympathetic to it takes a
“defensive” stance by aiming to debunk the conservative myth that sexual
minorities make bad parents and/or do not parent as effectively as their
straight counterparts. 118 For that reason, they continue, the objective of most
pro-gay comparative empirical work in this area has been to show that
lesbian and gay parents are just like heterosexual parents and that lesbian and
gay parenting is no different from heterosexual parenting. 119
In Stacey and Biblarz’s view, such “defensive” pro-gay research not only
adheres to a “heterosexis[t]” and “hierarchical model,” one that “implies that
differences indicate deficits,” but also “hampers research and analysis among
those who explicitly support lesbigay parenthood” because it fails to
investigate “whether (and how) differences in adult sexual orientation might
lead to meaningful differences in how individuals parent and how their
children develop.” 120 Indeed, this tendency “to tread gingerly around the
terrain of differences,” they argue, “compromises the development of
knowledge not only in child development and psychology, but also within
the sociology of sexuality, gender, and family more broadly.” 121 “When
researchers downplay the significance of any findings of differences,” the
authors conclude, “they forfeit a unique opportunity to take full advantage of
the ‘natural laboratory’ that the advent of lesbigay-parent families provides
for exploring the effects and acquisition of gender and sexual identity,
ideology, and behavior.” 122
In this article, then, Stacey and Biblarz propose a different approach, one
that represents a progressive “[r]ethinking [of] the ‘no differences’ doctrine”
that has shaped pro-gay family research; 123 in their words, theirs is an
“alternative strategy that moves beyond hetero-normativity without forfeiting
the fruitful potential of comparative research.” 124 To that end, the authors
meticulously re-examine twenty-one studies of lesbian and gay parenting that
were published over a seventeen-year period, from 1981 to 1998. 125 After
117 Id. at 163.
118 Id. at 162.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 116, at 162–63.
123 Id. at 163.
124 Id.
125 See id. at 167.
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doing so, Stacey and Biblarz confirm what both they and a handful of other
researchers had suspected, namely, that critical differences between straight
and lesbian/gay parenting exist. 126 Whereas those studies, Stacey and Biblarz
tell us, “almost uniformly claim to find no differences in measures of
parenting or child outcomes,” 127 their meta-analysis of those same studies’
findings suggests otherwise. As they put it: “[O]ur careful scrutiny of the
findings [the previous studies] report suggests that on some
dimensions . . . the sexual orientations of these parents matter somewhat
more for their children than the researchers claimed.” 128
More specifically, after revisiting the previous studies, Stacey and
Biblarz argue that they support the conclusion that differences between
lesbian/gay and straight parenting exist in three key areas: gender, sexuality,
and parenting practices. 129 First, the authors posit that the sexual orientation
of parents can have an influence on the gender identity of children,
particularly if those parents are lesbians (or, if one parent, a lesbian). 130 For
instance, Stacey and Biblarz report that according to one study children of
lesbian mothers (or of a lesbian mother) “more frequently dress, play, and
behave in ways that do not conform to sex-typed cultural norms.” 131
Daughters of lesbian mothers “reported higher aspirations to nontraditional
gender occupations,” with “53 percent . . . of the daughters of lesbians
aspir[ing] to careers such as doctor, lawyer, engineer, and astronaut,
compared with only 21 percent . . . of the daughters of heterosexual
mothers.” 132 Similarly, “[o]n some measures, like aggressiveness and play
preferences, the sons of lesbian mothers behave in less traditionally
126 Id. at 176. For other studies, see Gillian A. Dunne, What Difference Does
“Difference” Make? Lesbian Experience of Work and Family Life, in RELATING
INTIMACIES 189 (Julie Seymour & Paul Bagguley eds., 1999); G. Dorsey Green &
Frederick W. Bozett, Lesbian Mothers and Gay Fathers, in HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 197 (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds.,
1991); Charlotte J. Patterson, Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children, in THE LIVES
OF LESBIANS, GAYS, AND BISEXUALS: CHILDREN TO ADULTS 274 (Ritch C. SavinWilliams & Kenneth M. Cohen eds., 1996); Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of the
Lesbian Baby Boom: Behavioral Adjustment, Self-Concepts, and Sex Role Identity, in
LESBIAN AND GAY PSYCHOLOGY: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND CLINICAL APPLICATIONS 156
(B. Greene & G.M. Herek eds., 1994); Celia Kitzinger & Adrian Coyle, Lesbian and Gay
Couples: Speaking of Difference, 8 THE PSYCHOLOGIST 64 (1995); Charlotte J. Patterson,
Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD DEV. 1025 (1992).
127 Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 116, at 167.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 167.
130 Id. at 168.
131 Id.
132 Id. (citation omitted).
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masculine ways than those raised by heterosexual single mothers.” 133 In the
authors’ view, the studies suggest that “the sexual orientation of mothers
interacts with the gender of children in complex ways to influence gender
preferences and behavior.” 134 “Such findings raise provocative questions
about how children assimilate gender culture and interests,” they continue,
“questions that the propensity to downplay differences deters scholars from
exploring.” 135
Second, and more controversially, Stacey and Biblarz maintain that the
studies support the claim that parents’ sexual orientation can have an effect
on the sexuality of children. 136 For instance, the authors report that one study
of gay fathers and their adult sons provides “evidence of a moderate degree
of parent-to-child transmission of sexual orientation.” 137 Similarly, another
study suggests that “young adults reared by lesbian mothers
were . . . significantly more likely to report having thought they might
experience homoerotic attraction or relationships.” 138
Third, Stacey and Biblarz contend that the studies support the conclusion
that differences exist with respect to the parenting practices of straight and
lesbian parents. 139 For instance, “[c]hildren of lesbian mothers . . . report
feeling more able than children of heterosexual parents to discuss their sexual
development with their mothers and . . . their mothers’ partners.” 140 In
addition, lesbian mothers who conceived through donor insemination (DI)
“scored significantly higher than the DI heterosexual fathers on measures of
parenting skills, practices, and quality of interactions with children.” 141 In
fact, in Stacey and Biblarz’s view, the studies suggest that “lesbian coparents may enjoy greater parental compatibility and achieve particularly
high quality parenting skills” than their heterosexual counterparts (i.e.,
heterosexual mothers and fathers). 142 They contend that the comparative

133 Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 116, at 168.
134 Id. at 170.
135 Id.
136 Id. For an opposing view, see Carlos A. Ball, Lesbian and Gay Families: Gender

Nonconformity and the Implications of Difference, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 691, 702 (2003)
(“I do not believe . . . that we are anywhere near a minimum threshold of plausibility for
Stacey’s and Biblarz’s . . . conclusion that parents influence the sexual orientation of their
children.”).
137 Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 116, at 171.
138 Id. at 170.
139 Id. at 174.
140 Id. at 175.
141 Id. at 174.
142 Id.
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strengths of lesbian co-parents have something to do with both gender and
sexual orientation. In their words:
[S]exual orientation and gender should be viewed as interacting to create
new kinds of family structures and processes—such as an egalitarian
division of child care—that have fascinating consequences . . . for child
development . . . . Some of the evidence suggests that two women coparenting may create a synergistic pattern that brings more egalitarian,
compatible, shared parenting and time spent with children, greater
understanding of children, and closeness and communication between
parents and children. The genesis of this pattern cannot be understood on
the basis of either sexual orientation or gender alone. Such findings raise
fruitful comparative questions for future research about family dynamics
among two parents of the same or different gender who do or do not share
similar attitudes, values, and behaviors. 143

Stacey and Biblarz ultimately conclude not only that “modest and
interesting” differences exist between straight and lesbian/gay parents, 144 but
also that “the effects of parental gender trump those of sexual orientation,”
insofar as the research indicates that “children with two same-gender parents,
and particularly with co-mother parents, should develop in less genderstereotypical ways than would children with two heterosexual parents.” 145
As to the differences, the authors comment that, far from operating as
“deficits,” they either “favor the children with lesbigay parents, . . . or
represent ‘just a difference’ of the sort democratic societies should respect
and protect.” 146 They conclude their study by “recogniz[ing] the political
dangers” 147 of pointing out differences between straight and gay parenting,
and, in particular, of noting the possible relevance of a parent’s sexual
orientation on the development of his or her child’s/children’s own
sexuality. 148 Nevertheless, they remark, “[i]t is neither intellectually honest
nor politically wise to base a claim for justice on grounds that may prove
falsifiable empirically . . . . [T]he case for granting equal rights to
nonheterosexual parents should not require finding their children to be
identical to those reared by heterosexuals.” 149

143 Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 116, at 175 (citations omitted).
144 Id. at 176.
145 Id. at 177.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 178.
148 Id.
149 Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 116, at 178 (emphasis added).
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Since Stacey and Biblarz’s paper on the differences between straight and
gay parenting was published in 2001, social scientists have published a
number of other studies that suggest that significant differences exist
between straight and gay parenting as well as straight and gay relationships
more generally. 150 A New York Times Magazine article published just this
past November, for instance, cites to recent studies that highlight the
differences between straight and gay parenting, differences which, those
studies contend, account for the fact that children raised by gays and lesbians
are “more tolerant,” among other things, than those raised by straight
parents. 151 Indeed, the author of that article remarks that “[i]t is
striking . . . how comparatively rarely children are mentioned as an argument
in favor of gay marriage,” 152 as studies show that gay parenting tends to
promote equality in parenting, the latter of which might “also be better
for . . . children.” 153
Similarly, in 2003, renowned couples therapist, John Gottman, along
with Berkeley psychology professor, Robert Levenson, published two
longitudinal observational studies—the first of their kind—that tracked
partner interactions in gay and lesbian relationships. 154 Contrary to the
stereotype that same-sex relationships are less stable and more volatile than
their cross-sex counterparts, Gottman and Levenson found that gay and

150 While some studies of the differences between gay and straight relationships preexisted that of Stacey and Biblarz, the vast number of them have been published since
2001. For prior studies, see Lawrence A. Kurdek, Relationship Outcomes and Their
Predictors: Longitudinal Evidence From Heterosexual Married, Gay Cohabiting, and
Lesbian Cohabiting Couples, 60 J. OF MARRIAGE & FAM. 553 (1998) [hereinafter
Relationship Outcomes]; Lawrence A. Kurdek & J. Patrick Schmitt, Relationship Quality
of Partners in Heterosexual Married, Heterosexual Cohabiting, and Gay and Lesbian
Relationships, 51 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 711 (1986).
151 See Lisa Belkin, What’s Good for the Kids, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2009,
(Magazine), at 9, 11. Belkin alerts her audience to recent academic studies that
investigate the similarities as well as the differences between gay and straight parenting.
Id. at 9. Those studies include a recent book on the subject by Professor Abbie Goldberg.
See ABBIE E. GOLDBERG, LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN: RESEARCH
ON THE FAMILY LIFE CYCLE (2009).
152 Belkin, supra note 151, at 9 (emphasis added).
153 Id. at 11.
154 John Mordechai Gottman et al., Correlates of Gay and Lesbian Couples’
Relationship Satisfaction and Relationship Dissolution, 45 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 23
(2003) [hereinafter Correlates]; John Mordechai Gottman & Robert Wayne Levenson,
Observing Gay, Lesbian and Heterosexual Couples’ Relationships: Mathematical
Modeling on Conflict Interaction, 45 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 65 (2003) [hereinafter
Observing].
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lesbian relationships were not just “fundamentally different from
heterosexual relationships,” but also healthier in many key respects. 155
For instance, compared to heterosexual couples, gay/lesbian couples
were more “upbeat in the face of conflict,” 156 using “more affection and
humor when they bring up a disagreement.” 157 Moreover, gay/lesbian
couples “use[d] fewer controlling, hostile emotional tactics” than their
heterosexual counterparts, displaying “less belligerence, domineering and
fear with each other than straight couples do.” 158 Finally, “homosexual
couples were more positive in their influence on the partner in the positive
affect ranges and less negative in their influence on the partner in the
negative affect ranges than were heterosexual couples.” 159
Based on these and other observations, Gottman and Levenson conclude
that, far from confirming the stereotype of gay/lesbian instability, the studies
show that “heterosexual relationships may have a great deal to learn from
homosexual relationships.” 160 The authors suggest that at least part of the
reason why the gay and lesbian committed relationships that they observed
would “differ so much from heterosexual couples” is because same-sex
couples “value equality far more than [do] heterosexual couples.” 161 “The
greater negativity and lowered positivity of heterosexual couples,” they
conclude, “may have to do with the standard status hierarchy between men
and women, a pattern that research has shown is largely absent in same-sex
couples.” 162
Other studies support Gottman and Levenson’s conclusions that
lesbian/gay relationships appear to be stronger and less hierarchical in many
key respects than their heterosexual counterparts. For instance, Professor
Lawrence Kurdek, one of the first scientists to conduct sophisticated
longitudinal (although not observational) research on gay, lesbian, and
heterosexual married couples, 163 has concluded that lesbian/gay couples
155 Gottman & Levenson, Observing, supra note 154, at 84.
156 The Gottman Institute, 12-Year Study of Gay &

Lesbian Couples,
http://www.gottman.com/research/projects/gaylesbian (summarizing the findings from
the Journal of Homosexuality’s observational studies); see also Gottman & Levenson,
Observing, supra note 151, at 84–88.
157 The Gottman Institute, supra note 156.
158 Id.
159 Gottman et al., Observing, supra note 154, at 87.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 87–88.
162 Id. at 88.
163 See Kurdek, Relationship Outcomes, supra note 150; see also Lawrence A.
Kurdeck, Are Gay and Lesbian Cohabiting Couples Really Different From Heterosexual
Married Couples?, 66 J. OF MARRIAGE & FAM. 880 (2004) [hereinafter Are Gay and

976

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:4

“reported higher levels of private self-consciousness, openness, and comfort
with closeness” than straight couples. 164 Moreover, “[c]ompared to married
[heterosexual] partners,” Kurdek found, “lesbian relationships reported more
intimacy, more autonomy, [and] more equality.” 165
More recent research likewise suggests that lesbian and gay couples are
“more egalitarian than heterosexual couples” when it comes to the division of
labor in the household; 166 as one study reports, “being in a same-sex
relationship is more important in equalizing housework than is having similar
incomes.” 167 “In this regard,” the authors of that report state, “same-sex
couples are a model for ways of equalizing the division of housework.” 168
Furthermore, as also observed by Gottman and Levenson, researchers have
found that “same-sex couples engage in relationship maintenance behaviors
in more egalitarian ways.” 169 This “more egalitarian approach taken by
same-sex couples,” one researcher comments, “is an advantage that could
benefit straight couples too.” 170
Lesbian Cohabiting Couples]; Lawrence A. Kurdek, Differences Between HeterosexualNonparent Couples and Gay, Lesbian, and Heterosexual-Parent Couples, 22 J. OF FAM.
ISSUES 728 (2001) [hereinafter Differences Between].
164 Kurdek, Differences Between, supra note 163, at 747.
165 Gottman & Levenson, Observing, supra note 154, at 67 (summarizing Kurdek’s
findings).
166 Sondra E. Solomon, Esther D. Rothblum & Kimberly F. Balsam, Money,
Housework, Sex, and Conflict: Same-Sex Couples in Civil Unions, Those Not in Civil
Unions, and Heterosexual Married Siblings, 52 SEX ROLES 561, 572 (2005); see also
Malley Shechory & Riva Ziv, Relationships Between Gender Role Attitudes, Role
Division, and Perception of Equity Among Heterosexual, Gay and Lesbian Couples, 56
SEX ROLES 629, 635 (2007) (“As hypothesized, it was found that same-sex couples had
more liberal attitudes toward gender roles than heterosexual couples did . . . [W]e found
lesbian couples to be more egalitarian than heterosexual couples regarding the household
tasks.”).
167 Solomon et al., supra note 166, at 572; see also Shechory & Ziv, supra note 163,
at 636 (“Our results confirm those of Solomon et al. (2005), who found that sexual
orientation for both women and men were [sic] a stronger predictor of division of
household tasks than was income difference.”).
168 Solomon et al., supra note 166, at 572; see also Lisa Belkin, When Mom and
Dad Share It All, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008, (Magazine), at 74 (discussing studies which
have found that, as compared to heterosexual couples, “[l]esbian couples . . . have a more
equal division of housework”).
169 Solomon et al. supra note 166, at 573.
170 Same-Sex Couples More Likely To Have Satisfying Marital and Family
Relations, THAINDIAN NEWS, Jan. 13, 2008, http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/health/
same-sex-couples-more-likely-to-have-satisfying-marital-and-family-relations_10012659
html (Jan. 13, 2008) (paraphrasing Robert-Jay Green, executive director of the Rockway
Institute).
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Based on the empirical studies surveyed above, from those that study
how the sexual orientation of parents matters when it comes to raising
children to those that examine how labor is divided in a same-sex household,
one would expect to find the following sorts of arguments in marriage
equality briefs: “While same-sex couples might be like cross-sex couples
when it comes to the desire to marry, in some critical respects research
suggests that they are different from cross-sex couples when it comes to
structuring the division of household and parenting labor in a committed
relationship. One researcher, for instance, has suggested that, as compared to
cross-sex couples, ‘same-sex couples are a model for ways of equalizing the
division of housework.’” 171 Or: “It is unconstitutional to withhold the right
to marry from same-sex couples on the basis that cross-sex couples make
better parents because research suggests that, if anything, the perceptible
differences that do exist between lesbian/gay and straight parenting ‘favor
the children’ with lesbian/gay parents.” 172 Or finally: “Some quite prominent
and renowned scientists have argued that ‘heterosexual relationships may
have a great deal to learn from homosexual relationships.’ 173 As such, samesex marriage could serve an important educative function.”
To be sure, this is not at all to suggest that hierarchical, unequal, and
even abusive same-sex relationships do not exist. Indeed, and as Spindelman
has cogently argued, like-straight arguments are problematic not only
because they collapse same-sex relationships into cross-sex relationships, but
also because they elide the sexual violence that exists in gay and straight
communities alike. 174 It is to suggest, though, that like-straight rhetoric
profoundly under-represents the realities of gay relationships—whether it is
the reality of same-sex sexual violence (as Spindelman argues) or the reality
of difference between gays, straights, and the families, if any, that they raise.
While the empirical studies surveyed here certainly do not negate the
possibility of inequality and violence within same-sex relationships, they do
present a portrait of those relationships that is largely absent in gay rights
litigation (and, as The New York Times Magazine photo montage suggests, in
mainstream media portrayals of gay marriage as well). As discussed in Part
II, any acknowledgement of difference between same-sex and cross-sex
couples is missing in pro-marriage equality briefs—briefs which, predictably

171 Solomon et al., supra note 166, at 572 (emphasis added).
172 Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 116, at 177.
173 Gottman et al., Observing, supra note 154, at 87.
174 Spindelman, Sodomy Politics, supra note 30, at 6 (“The tightlipped silence in the

gay rights Lawrence briefs around the current realities of same-sex sexual violence within
the gay community keeps them exactly where male supremacy does and would keep
them among heterosexuals: invisible, hidden from public view.”).
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enough, largely do not cite to the aforementioned studies. 175 Indeed, the
dominant paradigm in both the public representation of gay marriage and the
arguments put forward by advocates in favor of that institution is one of nodifferences. That being the case, it is not surprising that gay advocates would
shy away from empirical studies that suggest otherwise.
With respect to progressive commentators’ reception of the StaceyBiblarz study in particular, Professor Clifford Rosky has recently observed
that “[i]n law review articles, legal scholars have generally downplayed the
article’s finding that there were ‘differences’ between the children of gay and
lesbian parents and the children of heterosexual parents.” 176 In fact, he
reports, “[t]hey do not acknowledge that the authors found significant
differences in children’s gender and sexual development at all.” 177 To the
extent that the Stacey-Biblarz study is cited in pro-marriage equality briefs, it
appears almost exclusively to support the propositions that “[e]mpirical
research over the past two decades has failed to find any meaningful
differences in the parenting ability of lesbian and gay parents compared to
heterosexual parents” 178 and that “scientific research has consistently shown
that the children of gay parents are no different from other children with
respect to their development.” 179 As one might expect, the differences that
Stacey and Biblarz did uncover are highlighted and embraced instead by
those who oppose marriage equality for sexual minorities. 180
Moreover, because the social, cultural, and legal understanding of gay
marriage has been so deeply informed by this no-differences paradigm, the
benefits or advantages of same-sex relationships—their egalitarianism, for
instance—go unnoticed. Recall here the two images of the “gay housewife,”
Joshua, and his husband, Benjamin, from The New York Times Magazine
175 See supra discussion at Part II.
176 Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood, and the

Gender of Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257, 336 (2009).
177 Id.
178 Amicus Curiae Brief of American Psychological Association at 38, Andersen v.
King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (No. 75934-1).
179 Brief of Amici Curiae Parents, Families & Friends of Lesbians and Gays, Inc. et
al. at 18, Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (Nos. 6589 & 6599).
180 See, e.g., Brief of Family Research Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendants-Appellants at 33, Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) (No. 44) (“In
reality, the same-sex parenting studies show a significant difference in outcome between
children raised by heterosexual mothers and those raised by lesbians. Stacey and Biblarz,
themselves proponents of same-sex parenting, challenge the intellectual honesty of the
reports of ‘no differences.’”). Rosky also notes that marriage “[o]pponents like [Lynn]
Wardle have welcomed [their] article, which they cite as conclusive proof that gay men
and lesbians should not be granted custody, visitation, adoption, or marriage rights.”
Rosky, supra note 176, at 336.
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piece on gay marriage in Massachusetts. 181 Each photo depicted a
conventional gendered division of labor in the household, with Joshua
cooking and vacuuming (i.e., performing what culture perceives to be
women’s work) and with Benjamin reading and looking on (i.e., doing what
culture perceives to be those things that the man of the house does). 182
Because these images were so closely tethered to heterosexual norms—or, at
least, to what culture imagines those norms to be—and to a no-differences
model, they failed to capture not only what is distinctive about many samesex relationships, but also what research suggests is their unique value,
including their tendency to promote an egalitarian work ethic at home. While
Joshua and Benjamin might have chosen to structure the division of labor in
their household in this way, studies suggest that many same-sex couples do
not (recall Denizet-Lewis’s observation that many of his subjects “bristled at
the notion that they would fashion their domestic lives around heterosexual
stereotypes” 183 ). The no-differences paradigm, then, profoundly
underrepresents reality, and quite possibly distorts it.

IV. TOWARD A NEW VISION OF SEXUAL EQUALITY: UNITED STATES V.
VIRGINIA AND THE CELEBRATION OF DIFFERENCE
A serious reconsideration of the no-differences model that has shaped the
social, cultural, and legal understanding of same-sex marriage is warranted
for two reasons: first, because that model, as Part III has explained, is
woefully incomplete; and second, because a model of equality that
incorporates difference, as Part V will argue, is normatively desirable. This
Part will put forward such a model, one that embraces, rather than rejects,
difference, as well as one that understands that differences might enhance,
rather than defeat, equality claims. That model, which the author hopes will
be one on which a vision of sexual equality might one day rest, will be based
in significant part on Justice Ginsburg’s United States v. Virginia majority
opinion, one that recognizes the value of difference even as it rejects the
state’s attempt to deny individuals equal opportunity on account of it. 184
To that end, Sections A and B will review Justice Ginsburg’s majority
opinion in Virginia and the “distinctive understanding of sex equality” that
emerges from it. 185 Section C will then consider the surprisingly limited role
that Virginia has played in pro-marriage equality briefs and the much more

181 Denizet-Lewis, supra note 31, at 29.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 35.
184 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
185 Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 9, at 74.
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pronounced role that Justice Ginsburg’s celebrated “differences” passage has
played in briefs opposing marriage equality for same-sex partners. Finally,
Section D will make the case for incorporating Virginia into sexual/marriage
equality advocacy and perhaps eventually into a sexual/marriage equality
jurisprudence.

A. United States v. Virginia: Justice Ginsburg’s Majority Opinion
The issue before the Court in United States v. Virginia was whether it
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution categorically to exclude women from the Virginia
Military Institute (VMI), an all-male state military college and the only
public educational institution in Virginia to discriminate on the basis of
sex. 186 At trial, the Commonwealth advanced several sex- or gender-related
reasons why VMI was unsuitable to women. In particular, the
Commonwealth maintained that both “gender-based physiological
differences” 187 and “gender-based developmental differences” 188 existed
between men and women that would make it difficult, if not impossible, for
members of the latter group to satisfy the rigorous physical, psychological,
and emotional demands of VMI’s adversative method, the training protocol
that rendered VMI “distinctive” 189 in a way that contributed to the
Commonwealth’s overall “objective of educational diversity.” 190 Women, in
the Commonwealth’s view, were so physically, psychologically, and socially
different from men that to admit them into VMI would be to change the very
thing that made the school unique. 191 In turn, because VMI’s uniqueness
would be lost were it to admit women, the Commonwealth argued, it
followed that the school’s exclusionary policy satisfied intermediate scrutiny,
as it was substantially related to the important state interest of achieving
educational diversity—the educational diversity, that is, that a unique school
like VMI represented within the educational system of the Commonwealth as
a whole. 192

186 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550.
187 United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1432 (W.D. Va. 1991).
188 Id. at 1434.
189 Id. at 1413.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 1414.
192 Id. at 1413 (“I find that both VMI’s single-sex status and its distinctive

educational method represent legitimate contributions to diversity in the Virginia higher
education system, and that excluding women is substantially related to this mission.”).
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In its initial judgment, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s
ruling on the ground that the Commonwealth failed to advance “any state
policy by which it can justify its determination, under an announced policy of
[educational] diversity, to afford VMI’s unique type of program to men and
not to women.” 193 Moreover, the appeals court remanded the case to the
district court to compel the Commonwealth “to formulate, adopt, and
implement a plan” that conformed “with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” 194 In a final judgment, the Fourth Circuit agreed
with the district court that the “plan” that the Commonwealth later devised—
opening up a “parallel” institution for women at another school (which
turned out to be patently unequal) rather than integrating VMI—was
constitutional. 195 Both sides appealed to the Supreme Court, the
Commonwealth on the ground that its gender exclusionary policy did not
violate, and the United States on the ground that the Commonwealth’s
remedy did violate, the Equal Protection Clause. 196
In a landmark majority opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s initial judgment with respect to
the constitutionality of VMI’s exclusionary program, 197 and reversed the
Fourth Circuit’s final judgment with respect to the constitutionality of the
Commonwealth’s proposed remedy. 198 First, in responding to the
Commonwealth’s sex-related justifications for denying women admission
into VMI in the first place, all of which centered on the claim that VMI was
“inherently unsuitable to women” 199 because of alleged gender-based
physiological, psychological, and social differences between the sexes,
Justice Ginsburg stated the following:
Supposed “inherent differences” are no longer accepted as a ground for race
or national origin classifications. Physical differences between men and

193 United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992).
194 Id. at 900.
195 United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1241 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding that

the creation of a separate public school for women is constitutional, assuming that “[t]he
opportunities that would be open both to men and women are sufficiently comparable”).
196 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 530–31 (1996).
197 Id. at 546 (“Virginia, in sum, has fallen far short of establishing the exceedingly
persuasive justification that must be the solid base for any gender-defined
classification.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
198 Id. at 555–56 (“In sum, Virginia’s remedy does not match the constitutional
violation; the Commonwealth has shown no ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for
withholding from women qualified for the experience premier training of the kind VMI
affords.”).
199 Id. at 541.

982

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:4

women, however, are enduring: “[T]he two sexes are not fungible; a
community made up exclusively of one [sex] is different from a community
composed of both.”
“Inherent differences” between men and women, we have come to
appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s
opportunity. Sex classifications may be used to compensate women “for
particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,” to “promot[e] equal
employment opportunity,” to advance full development of the talent and
capacities of our Nation’s people. But such classifications may not be used,
as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic
inferiority of women. 200

Conceding that women and men might be different in all sorts of
biological, social, and cultural ways, Justice Ginsburg nevertheless made
clear that such differences could not function as a liability nor as a reason to
deny members of either sex equal opportunity. While differences—or, at
least, “physical” or biological differences—might flow from nature,
constraints on individual opportunity that are predicated on those differences
have the character of artifice, as those constraints are, in her words,
“artificial,” and therefore unlike the physical/biological differences that give
rise to them.
Justice Ginsburg’s statements in Virginia regarding the reality of gender
difference anticipate some of her more recent observations on that subject,
observations that suggest that the author of Virginia’s majority opinion
understands gender difference to encompass more than just
physical/biological difference. For instance, her remarks regarding the
reactions of her eight male colleagues to a case recently decided by the Court
that involved a public school’s strip search of a thirteen-year-old girl, Safford
Unified School District v. Redding, 201 indicate that she believes that men and
women (or at least male and female jurists) have unique interpretive
perspectives because of their sex and the individual experiences that flow
from it. During oral argument in Safford, the male justices could not
understand why the strip search of a young female teenager was so
objectionable; Justice Breyer in particular remarked that when he was that
age “people did sometimes stick things in my underwear” in the locker

200 Id. at 533–34 (internal citations omitted).
201 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2644 (2009)

(holding, in part, that a public school’s strip search of a thirteen-year-old girl who was
suspected of distributing contraband drugs was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution).

2009]

CELEBRATING DIFFERENCES

983

room. 202 In an interview with Joan Biskupic of USA Today, Justice Ginsburg
later commented: “They have never been a 13-year-old girl. It’s a very
sensitive age for a girl . . . . I didn’t think that my colleagues, some of them,
quite understood.” 203
During that same interview, Justice Ginsburg also told Biskupic that in
two recent employment discrimination cases in which she dissented and
which ruled against female claimants alleging a compensation-related Title
VII violation, AT&T v. Hulteen 204 and Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 205 her male colleagues showed “a certain lack of understanding” 206 of
the kind of bias that women face in the workplace. In addition, she suggested
that the current gender imbalance on the Court has real consequences. Not
only are “there . . . perceptions that [female justices] have because we are
women,” 207 she explained, but female justices “can be sensitive to things that
are said in draft opinions that (male justices) are not aware can be
offensive.” 208 These sex-based differences, she continued, are even
“sometimes in the outcome” of a decision. 209 In a more recent interview for
The New York Times Magazine, Justice Ginsburg remarked that “women

202 Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Safford, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (No. 08-479), 2009

WL 1064200.
203 Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: The Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY, May
6, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2009-05-05ruthginsburg_N.htm; see also Neil A. Lewis, Debate On Whether Female Judges Decide
Differently Arises Anew, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2009, at A16 (summarizing these
comments).
204 AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962, 1966 (2009) (holding that an employer
does not violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act when it calculates female employees’
pension benefits under an accrual rule that was in effect before that Act and that gave less
retirement credit for pregnancy leave than for medical leave generally).
205 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007) (holding
that a female employee’s sex-related pay discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was time barred under that Act, which requires plaintiffs alleging pay
discrimination to file a claim with the EEOC not later than 180 days after the first
instance of the alleged pay discrimination), superseded by statute, The Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, 5–6 (2009) (amending 42 USC
§ 2000e-5(e)) (providing that “an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to
discrimination in compensation[,] . . . each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is
paid”).
206 Biskupic, supra note 203.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
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bring a different life experience to the table,” 210 even as she disagreed (in
that same interview) with the notion that female judges will arrive at a certain
conclusion simply because “that’s the way women are.” 211
Justice Ginsburg’s recent remarks to the media suggest that she
understands “‘inherent differences’ between men and women” to capture far
more than just physical difference alone. Of course, that Justice Ginsburg
was focused on physical differences between the sexes in her Virginia
opinion is a plausible interpretation given that it explicitly, and exclusively,
highlights gender differences of the “physical” variety. 212 At the same time,
however, in Virginia Justice Ginsburg also cites to Ballard v. United
States, 213 a case that addressed not physical differences between the sexes,
but rather perspectival differences between them, for what was at issue there
were jury qualifications and whether a jury of both sexes was different from
a jury of just one sex. In observing that “a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if
either sex is excluded” from a jury, the Ballard Court very much answered
that latter question in the affirmative. 214 Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg’s
inherent differences passage, as noted above, was responding to the
Commonwealth’s
claim
that
physical
as
well
as
psychological/social/emotional differences between the sexes justified the
exclusion of women from VMI. 215 Thus, coupled with Justice Ginsburg’s
recent statements regarding the important role that gender can play in
understanding, and perhaps even in judging, cases, both the content and the
context of Virginia’s inherent differences passage suggest that its author
understands gender difference to encompass something more than just
physical/biological distinctions alone.
Second, in responding to the United States’ claim that Virginia’s
proposed remedy failed to satisfy the constitutional requirements of equal
protection, Justice Ginsburg and a majority of the Court agreed. The
proposed remedy was unconstitutional because the ostensibly “parallel”
210 Emily Bazelon, The Place of Women on the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009,
(Magazine), at 24.
211 Id. at 25.
212 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“Physical differences
between men and women . . . are enduring.”).
213 Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195–96 (1946) (holding that the
deliberate exclusion of women from the panel from which petit and grand juries were
drawn in a case tried in federal court in California, where women were eligible for jury
service, required dismissal of indictment).
214 Id. at 194 (“The exclusion of one [sex] may indeed make the jury less
representative of the community than would be true if an economic or racial group were
excluded.”).
215 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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institution was patently unequal, lacking not only the tangible resources, but
also the prestige and the unique experience that VMI offered. 216 In addition,
the majority found that to refuse to provide women with the same experience
that the male VMI cadets received would be to perpetuate “generalizations”
and stereotypes about the proper roles of men and women in society. 217
Finally, while recognizing that VMI would have to make minimal
adjustments if forced to integrate, particularly with respect to living
arrangements, Justice Ginsburg also reasoned that if even just some women
could satisfy the physical, psychological, and emotional rigors of the
adversative method, then that was enough to find that the Commonwealth’s
remedy was not a constitutional one. 218 In the majority opinion’s words: “It
is on behalf of these women that the United States has instituted this suit, and
it is for them that a remedy must be crafted.” 219 Inherent differences between
the sexes, in other words, did not really matter if at least some women could
attend VMI without fundamentally altering what made that institution
special.
It is worth noting that this idea that constitutional guarantees of equal
protection are designed to protect the unique or exceptional case—i.e., those
women who can satisfy the demands of VMI’s adversative method—is
something that Justice Ginsburg would return to in Gonzales v. Carhart 220
(and also something with which Justice Scalia strongly disagrees in his
Virginia dissent 221 ). In Carhart, as is well known, Justice Ginsburg
vehemently dissented from the Court’s decision to uphold the
constitutionality of the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003. In
responding to the majority’s contention that the Act survived a facial
constitutional challenge because respondents failed to show that the ban
would be unconstitutional “in a large fraction of relevant cases,” 222 Justice
Ginsburg noted that “[i]t makes no sense to conclude that this facial
challenge fails because respondents have not shown that a health exception is
necessary for a large fraction of second-trimester abortions, including those

216 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 551–54.
217 Id. at 550.
218 Id.
219 Id. (emphasis added).
220 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007) (upholding the constitutionality

of the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 on its face).
221 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Supreme Court of the
United States does not sit to announce ‘unique’ dispositions.”).
222 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 167–68.

986

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:4

for which a health exception is unnecessary: The very purpose of a health
exception is to protect women in exceptional cases.” 223
As in Virginia, so too in Carhart does Justice Ginsburg articulate a
vision of law that protects—and perhaps especially protects—the exceptional
case. In so doing, she nicely responds to a concurring opinion from the first
sex discrimination case ever considered by the Supreme Court, Bradwell v.
Illinois. 224 There, in agreeing with the Court to uphold the Illinois Supreme
Court’s refusal to grant a married woman’s application to practice law in that
state, Justice Bradley reasoned that the denial was constitutional in light of
the inherent differences between men and women—or, in his memorable
locution, “in view of the peculiar characteristics, destiny, and mission of
woman.” 225 That Mrs. Bradwell, a married woman, wanted to deviate from
the so-called norms of her sex by practicing law was of no moment. “[T]he
rules of civil society,” Justice Bradwell observed, “must be adapted to the
general constitution of things and cannot be based on exceptional cases.” 226

B. Virginia’s Vision of Difference: “Ambitious” and “Distinctive”
As mentioned earlier, Sunstein has commented that Virginia is “an
ambitious opinion” that “offers a distinctive understanding of sex
equality.” 227 “The depth of the Court’s opinion in United States v. Virginia,”
he writes, “can be found in the Court’s understanding of the principle of
gender equality.” In recognizing both that inherent “biological and social
differences between men and women” exist and that “these differences are to
be ‘celebrate[d,]’ not turned into a source of inequality,” Justice Ginsburg’s
majority opinion advances an ambitious conception of gender equality.
“Significantly,” Sunstein observes, this conception of gender equality
“avoids a claim that women are not biologically or socially different from
men. It also avoids a claim that those differences justify unequal
treatment.” 228
223 Id. at 188–89 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
224 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 137 (1872).
225 Id. at 142 (Bradley, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
226 Id. at 141–42 (emphasis added); see also id. at 141 (“It is true that many women

are unmarried and not affected by any of the duties, complications, and incapacities
arising out of the married state, but these are exceptions to the general rule.”) (emphasis
added).
227 Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 9, at 74; see also SUNSTEIN,
ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 165 (noting that the Virginia “Court offered a
particular understanding of sex equality”).
228 Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 9, at 76–77; see also SUNSTEIN,
ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 169 (“The [Virginia] Court emphasizes that there
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To be sure, Justice Ginsburg’s reckoning with difference in Virginia is
“distinctive” and “particular” because it departs in intriguing ways from
Supreme Court precedent on the legal significance of sex/gender difference
as well as from some of the dominant feminist critiques of the law’s
approach to sex/gender difference. First, it departs from Supreme Court
precedent on the legal significance of sex/gender difference because it
recognizes not only that sex/gender differences exist, but also that such
differences cannot be turned into a disadvantage nor relied upon to
perpetuate stereotypical ways of thinking about the relative positions of men
and women in public life. Unlike Virginia, as well as Justice Ginsburg’s
more recent pronouncements regarding gender difference, prior sex equality
cases either did not recognize gender difference or relied on it too much in
order to justify unequal treatment—unequal treatment that, in turn,
perpetuated gender stereotypes.
In Reed v. Reed, for instance, the Supreme Court struck down a sexbased estate administration classification on the ground that it was irrational
to assume that women were different from men when it came to
administering estates. 229 Insofar as the Reed decision “rejected as ‘irrational’
the view that women might be different from men with respect to their ability
to handle the traditionally ‘male’ responsibilities of estate administration,” 230
it has been characterized by some commentators as “profoundly
assimilationist,” 231 embracing as it did a no-differences model and its
assimilative ideal. Alternatively, in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma
County, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a sex-specific statutory rape
law on the ground that reproductive differences—the fact that only women
could become pregnant—justified the law’s differential treatment of the
sexes. 232
Whereas the Reed decision flatly rejected the possibility of difference,
the Michael M. decision arguably could not take its eyes off of it. The
Virginia decision departs from both. Unlike Reed, and like Michael M.,

are indeed differences between men and women, some of them biological, some of them
social. Its claim is that differences are to be ‘celebrated,’ and not turned into a source of
inequality. Thus the opinion suggests that the problem of sex equality is a problem of
second-class citizenship, in which women’s differences from men are used, by the state,
as a reason for prescribing gender roles in a way that deprives women of equal
opportunity.”).
229 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971).
230 Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279,
1304–05 (1987).
231 Id. at 1304.
232 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 472–73 (1981).
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Virginia recognizes that differences exist. Like Reed, and unlike Michael M.,
Virginia demands equality of treatment.
Second, Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Virginia departs from
some of the dominant feminist critiques of the law’s approach to sex/gender
difference because it offers a kind of third alternative to feminism’s two
dominant sex equality models, even as it partakes of both. In one sense, the
opinion partakes of an asymmetrical equality model. The asymmetrical
equality model, Professor Christine Littleton explains, “rejects the notion that
all gender differences are likely to disappear, or even that they should,” and
maintains that the law should attempt to deal with those differences, or at
least some of them, in some way. 233 Whatever “way” that might be depends
on which variety of asymmetrical equality one adopts. While some
asymmetrical equality model proponents support special rights/special
treatment, others support accommodation and acceptance. 234 Of primary
importance here, however, is the fact that the asymmetrical equal model
recognizes the reality of gender difference and rejects a definition of sex
equality that relies on “a ‘mathematical fallacy’—that is, the view that only
things that are the same can ever be equal.” 235
Insofar as Justice Ginsburg’s Virginia opinion, like her more public
remarks, embraces gender difference (biological and social alike), it would
not be wrong to say that it exhibits features of the asymmetrical equality
model (at least with respect to its understanding of difference). Indeed, it is
asymmetrical in the sense that it not only acknowledges gender difference,
but “celebrates” it. 236 In this sense, the opinion represents a strong version of
asymmetrical equality, as some proponents of that model would only go so
far as to say that the law should tolerate difference, not necessarily celebrate
it. 237
In another sense, however, Justice Ginsburg’s Virginia majority opinion
also partakes of a symmetrical equality model. That model, Littleton
explains, “attempt[s] to equate legal treatment of sex with that of race and
deny that there are in fact any significant natural differences between women
and men; in other words, to consider the two sexes symmetrically located

233 Littleton, supra note 230, at 1292.
234 Id. at 1295 (“Asymmetrical

approaches include ‘special rights,’
‘accommodation,’ ‘acceptance,’ and ‘empowerment.’”).
235 Id. at 1282.
236 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“‘Inherent differences’
between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration.”).
237 Littleton, supra note 230, at 1295 (observing that “[a]symmetrical approaches to
sexual equality . . . argue that any sexually equal society must somehow deal with
difference, problematic as that may be”).
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with regard to any issue, norm or rule.” 238 Under the symmetrical equality
model, sex-based differences are minimized, if not denied altogether, and the
focus instead is on assimilation, which itself “is based on the notion that
women, given the chance, really are or could be just like men.” 239 Under this
view, Littleton explains, “the law should require social institutions to treat
women as they already treat men—requiring, for example, that the
professions admit women to the extent they are ‘qualified.’” 240
Insofar as Justice Ginsburg’s Virginia opinion makes clear that women
must be treated in nearly all ways just like men when it comes to being a
student at VMI, it would not be wrong to say that it exhibits features of the
symmetrical equality model. To be sure, the opinion approximates
symmetrical equality not because it minimizes sex-based differences—quite
the contrary. Rather, it approximates the symmetrical equality model because
it maintains that the Commonwealth must treat eligible females and eligible
males the same, notwithstanding their inherent differences, because at least
some women can satisfy the rigorous demands of the adversative method. 241
While the majority opinion recognizes that VMI might have to change in
some ways were it to integrate, 242 it places most of its emphasis on the fact
that at least some women will be able to satisfy VMI’s physical,
psychological, and emotional rigors. As with proponents of symmetrical
equality, then, Justice Ginsburg believes that VMI must integrate precisely
because at least some of the women who apply there are “qualified.”
The point here, however, is that while Justice Ginsburg’s Virginia
opinion partakes of both equality models, it fully mirrors neither. Unlike the
asymmetrical equality model, Virginia’s vision of sex equality does not
require that institutions—there, VMI—really change all that much (and
sacrifice what renders them unique) in order to accommodate inherent
difference. Unlike the symmetrical equality model, Virginia’s vision of sex
equality does not require that the law view men and women as the same in

238 Id. at 1291. For a notable example of this approach, see Wendy W. Williams,

The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 WOMEN’S
RTS. L. REP. 175, 196 (1982).
239 Littleton, supra note 230, at 1292.
240 Id.
241 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542 (“The issue . . . is not whether ‘women—or men—
should be forced to attend VMI’; rather, the question is whether the Commonwealth can
constitutionally deny to women who have the will and capacity, the training and attendant
opportunities that VMI uniquely affords.”); see also id. at 550 (agreeing with the lower
court that “some women . . . do well under [the] adversative model”) (citation omitted).
242 See id. at 550 n.19 (“Admitting women to VMI would undoubtedly require
alterations necessary to afford members of each sex privacy from the other sex in living
arrangements, and to adjust aspects of the physical training program.”).

990

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:4

order to be treated equally. To return to Sunstein’s careful assessment of
what makes Virginia’s vision of sex equality a unique one as far as the
Supreme Court’s sex jurisprudence goes, it “avoids a claim that women are
not biologically or socially different from men” and at the same time “avoids
a claim that those differences justify unequal treatment.” 243

C. The Role of Virginia’s Vision of Difference in Marriage Equality
Litigation
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in United States v. Virginia has
played a noticeably thin role in pro-marriage equality briefs and decisions.
With few notable exceptions, briefs filed by advocates for the same-sex
couple plaintiffs in marriage equality litigation have largely neglected to cite
to the Court’s “inherent differences” passage. 244 Moreover, that passage has
not appeared in any of the four state supreme court decisions that have held
that limiting the definition of marriage to cross-sex couples violates state
constitutional equality and/or due process guarantees. 245 To the extent that
pro-marriage equality briefs or pro-marriage equality decisions advert to
Virginia, they do so instead to support the proposition that the creation of a
separate legal status for same-sex couples, such as civil union or domestic
partnership recognition, does not cure the constitutional violation of
withholding marriage from those couples in the first place. Just as Virginia
243 Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 9, at 76–77.
244 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae OneIowa et al. at 24–25, Varnum v. Brien, 763

N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (No. 07-1499); Brief of Respondents at 43, Andersen v. King
County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (No. 75934-1). The conclusion of OneIowa’s brief is
worth quoting in full:
As the Supreme Court has written in explaining its rejection of most sex-based
classifications, there remain differences between the sexes, and the “‘[i]nherent
differences’ between men and women . . . remain cause for celebration, . . . not for
denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an
individual’s opportunity.” So it is with sexual orientation. Just as we celebrate the
differences between the genders, so we can recognize and celebrate the different
experiences that same-sex and opposite-sex relationships contribute to the complex
tapestry of our community. It is time to put behind us the condemnation that has
transformed “difference” into “discrimination” and excluded gay men and lesbians
from the principles of equal citizenship, fairness and dignity that are their shared
birthright.

Brief of Amici Curiae OneIowa, supra, at 24–25 (citation omitted).
245 See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); In re Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v.
Horton, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591 (Sup. Ct. 2009); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957
A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003).
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found that the Commonwealth could not cure the constitutional violation that
the Court found in that case by creating a separate (and inferior) institution
for women, they argue, neither can the state cure the constitutional violation
of restricting marriage to cross-sex couples by creating a separate (and
inferior) institution for same-sex couples. 246
While scarce in pro-marriage equality arguments, Virginia’s vision of
“inherent differences” has played an active role in arguments deployed by
those who oppose marriage equality. For instance, marriage opponents have
variously argued to courts that it is not irrational for the state to promote
dual-gender marriage and to discourage same-sex marriage because, as
“Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has pointed out, the ‘two sexes
are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one [sex] is different
from a community composed of both.’” 247 In the words of one amicus brief
filed in Washington’s marriage equality case, “[p]laintiffs wish to live in a
world with no gender differences,” when in fact even the Supreme Court has
stated that “inherent differences” between the sexes not only exist, but are
“enduring.” 248 Or, in the words of another friend of court brief that was filed
in Maryland’s marriage equality case, it is important to “[a]ppreciat[e] the
innate differences between men and women and the unique contributions
each sex makes in child-rearing” because “[a]s Supreme Court Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg has pointed out, . . . ‘[i]nherent differences between men and
women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration.’” 249
These briefs almost uniformly cite to Professor Douglas Kmiec, who has
recently called attention to the fact that even Justice Ginsburg, a champion of
gender equality, has acknowledged that inherent gender difference not only
exists but should be “celebrated.” In his words:
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has been a thoughtful advocate for gender
equality throughout her career, yet, she has written for the Court that the
genders are simply not identical . . . In this, Justice Ginsburg fairly rejects
the same-sex claim that “the modern individuation of women has resulted in

246 See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary

Judgment at 48, Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (No. NNH-CV 044001813).
247 Brief Amicus Curiae of The American Center for Law & Justice in Support of
Respondent Proposition 22 Legal Defense And Education Fund at 12–13, Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (No. S147999).
248 Intervenor’s Reply Brief at 18–19, Andersen, 138 P.3d 963 (No. 75934-1).
249 Brief of the American Center for Law & Justice, Northeast, Inc., as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 16, Deane v. Conaway, No. 2499 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. June 22, 2006).
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the kind of fluidity of gender roles for men and women” that makes the
presence of both genders within a family unnecessary. 250

That marriage progressives would deliberately avoid citing to Justice
Ginsburg’s inherent differences passage—or to any of her recent
pronouncements on the reality and significance of gender on the Supreme
Court—makes sense on a number of levels. First, the passage disrupts the
like-straight reasoning/no-differences model on which marriage equality
arguments have largely rested. Indeed, there would seem to be little, if any,
room for the acknowledgement of difference of any kind, be it sex/gender
difference or sexual orientation difference, in a world dominated by the
“‘mathematical fallacy’—that is, the view that only things that are the same
can ever be equal.” 251
Second, under one view at least (although not one with which this Essay
agrees), the inherent differences passage suggests that the High Court of the
Nation views same-sex relationships not only as different from their crosssex counterparts, but also as less desirable than them. Indeed, by suggesting
that differences should be a cause for celebration rather than for the
denigration of either sex, and by citing to a case, Ballard v. United States,
which observes that “a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is
excluded” from democratic institutions like the jury, 252 Virginia might be
read to indicate that VMI would gain something by integrating and by
becoming a dual-sex institution (and, by extension, that marriage would lose
something by becoming a single-sex community). That being the case, gay
advocates might believe that by citing to Virginia’s inherent differences
language, they are implicitly suggesting that same-sex marriage lacks the
“flavor” and “distinct quality” that all institutions—including, of course,
marriage—enjoy by virtue of having both sexes in them.
Third and last, the inherent differences passage is susceptible to the same
sort of interpretation to which it was put by a majority of the Court in
Nguyen v. INS. 253 There, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal
immigration law that made it more difficult for a non-marital child born
abroad to one parent who was a United States citizen to claim citizenship
through that parent if it was the father rather than the mother. 254 The
250 Douglas W. Kmiec, The Procreative Argument for Proscribing Same-Sex

Marriage, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 653, 656 n.6 (2005) (quoting Maura I. Strassberg,
Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy, and Same-Sex Marriage, 75
N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1606 (1997)).
251 Littleton, supra note 230, at 1282.
252 Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 194 (1946).
253 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 68 (2001).
254 Id. at 58–59.
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government argued, in part, that the law was constitutional because it
advanced the government’s interest in ensuring that the non-marital child and
the citizen parent “have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to
develop not just a relationship that is recognized, as a formal matter, by the
law, but one that consists of the real, everyday ties that provide a connection
between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.” 255 Unwed
citizen mothers, unlike unwed citizen fathers, automatically established that
relationship during pregnancy and birth. 256 It therefore followed, in the
government’s view, that a law that placed additional burdens on unwed
citizen fathers when naturalizing their biological children born overseas
passed constitutional muster, as such a law did nothing more than reflect the
biological/reproductive advantages that women already had over men to
begin with. 257
A majority of the Court agreed and upheld the law. Writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy reasoned that “[t]here is nothing irrational or
improper in the recognition that at the moment of birth . . . the mother’s
knowledge of the child and the fact of parenthood have been established in a
way not guaranteed in the case of the unwed father.” 258 Moreover, citing
United States v. Virginia’s acknowledgement that “[p]hysical differences
between men and women . . . are enduring,” Justice Kennedy flatly stated,
“This is not a stereotype.” 259 Notwithstanding the dissenting Justices’
observation that the law rested on “impermissible stereotypes” of the sort that
the Court’s prior sex equality jurisprudence had solidly rejected, 260 the
majority, perhaps again thinking of Virginia, concluded that “[t]he difference
between men and women in relation to the birth process is a real one.” 261
In light of Nguyen’s reliance on Virginia in support of the proposition
that inherent biological difference justifies differential legal treatment of the
sexes, it makes sense that gay advocates might want to shy away from
Virginia’s vision of difference in marriage equality briefs, intent as those
briefs are on leveling any difference whatsoever between an intimate
community of two sexes (cross-sex marriage) and an intimate community of
one sex (same-sex marriage). To be sure, the Nguyen majority failed to
recognize what the Nguyen dissent—authored by Justice O’Connor and

255 Id. at 64–65.
256 Id. at 65.
257 See id. at 64–65.
258 Id. at 68.
259 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533

(1996)).
260 Id. at 79, 89 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
261 Id. at 73 (majority opinion).
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joined by Justice Ginsburg—made perfectly clear: that “overbroad sex-based
generalizations are impermissible even when they enjoy empirical
support,” 262 that is, even when it appears that “real” biological differences
have “real” effects. (It also failed, for that matter, to recognize what Virginia
made perfectly clear, namely, that even “real” difference is never good
enough of a reason to justify unequal treatment that denies equal
opportunity.) Nevertheless, given that a majority of the Supreme Court itself
has invoked Virginia in support of the idea that the government does not
violate constitutional equality guarantees when it classifies on the basis of
“real” difference, it is understandable that gay advocates might be reluctant
to call attention to the sorts of differences surveyed in Part III and to the part
of Virginia that highlights inherent differences between the sexes.

D. Incorporating Virginia’s Vision of Difference into Pro-Marriage
Equality Arguments
As with the empirical studies surveyed in Part III, however, just because
pro-marriage equality advocates have not used Virginia’s vision of difference
in marriage equality litigation does not mean that they could not—or, as Part
V will argue, that they should not. Apart from a more normative
consideration of why it makes sense for gay advocates to turn to Justice
Ginsburg’s (and Virginia’s) vision of difference in that litigation, which the
next Part will undertake, there are more than a few reasons why that vision is
not incompatible, and is even compatible, with the argument that
exclusionary marriage laws violate constitutional equality guarantees.
Whereas some of those reasons relate to what Virginia actually said with
respect to the role that sex difference should or should not play in public life,
others relate to what Virginia can be said to stand for in a larger, more
symbolic sense.
First, and more narrowly, Virginia never said that inherent biological or
social differences between the sexes justify unequal treatment by the state—
indeed, quite the contrary. As discussed earlier, marriage equality opponents
have cited to Virginia in support of the proposition that exclusionary
marriage laws are constitutional because they rest on the legitimate state
interest of privileging gender difference over gender similarity, something
which Virginia indicated was not only “[i]nherent,” but also worthy of
“celebration.” 263 What those oppositional arguments fail to recognize,
however, is that Virginia also stands for the proposition that inherent
difference, while something that both exists and is worthy of celebration,
cannot be relied upon by the state to perpetuate stereotypes about the sexes’
262 Id. at 76 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
263 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
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relative positions in public life or “for denigration of the members of either
sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.” 264 Inherent
difference, in other words, cannot justify governmental treatment that denies
equal opportunity. To the extent that cross-sex marriage restrictions deny
equal opportunity because of sex and sex stereotypes, which they
undoubtedly do, they constitute just the sort of governmental action that
Virginia explicitly denounces.
In addition, and again, contrary to oppositional marriage arguments that
rely on Virginia to suggest otherwise, Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion
never once indicates that mixed-sex institutions—VMI, the jury, or
marriage—are superior to those of the single-sex variety. Rather, citing
Ballard, her opinion simply states that “a community made up exclusively of
one [sex] is different from a community composed of both,” 265 not
necessarily better than it. Indeed, part of what made Justice Ginsburg’s
majority opinion in Virginia an “ambitious” one, according to Sunstein, was
that she left open the possibility that an all-female educational environment
would not violate constitutional equality guarantees, as long as it was truly
equal in all tangible and intangible respects to its all-male educational
counterpart. 266 The problem with Virginia’s proposed remedy to the
constitutional violation that the Court found in that case—the creation of an
all-female public institution in Virginia—was that it was not equal in any
respect to VMI. If it had been, the author of Virginia’s majority opinion
suggests, then the Court might have ruled otherwise with respect to the
remedial portion of its opinion.
This is all just to say that Virginia has been misinterpreted by marriage
equality opponents to say something that it does not say and that supposedly
renders it incompatible with any sort of pro-marriage equality argument that
recognizes difference. Indeed, if anything, Virginia’s recognition of the
differences between same-sex and mixed-sex communities is quite
compatible with some of the findings of social scientists with respect to the
differences that exist between same-sex and cross-sex relationships—
differences, these scientists speculate, that flow at least as much (if not more)
from the same-sex nature of a same-sex relationship as they do from the
sexual orientation of its members. Put differently, Virginia’s inherent
differences passage would only support the empirical data, discussed earlier,
that indicate that differences between same-sex and cross-sex couples exist
264 Id.
265 Id. (emphasis added).
266 See Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 9, at 77 (stating that

Virginia “avoids a claim that equal treatment is necessarily required in all contexts” and
that “the Court left open the possibility that it would uphold a law that promotes both
educational diversity and equal opportunity”).
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across a number of important domains—including those domains, such as
parenting and the family, that have figured so heavily in marriage equality
litigation—in large part because of the single-sex nature of the intimate
community that is a same-sex relationship.
Second, and more broadly, it is not just that Virginia is not incompatible
with a pro-marriage equality position that recognizes the differences between
same-sex and cross-sex relationships that flow from gender; it is also that it is
eminently compatible with a vision of equality more generally that
challenges the mathematical fallacy with respect to equal treatment on the
basis of sexual choice. As mentioned earlier, marriage equality advocacy
specifically, and gay rights advocacy more generally, rests on a symmetrical
model of equality, one that assumes that sameness is a necessary precondition for equal treatment. As far as sex equality is concerned, Justice
Ginsburg’s Virginia opinion in part disrupts this symmetrical model of
equality by recognizing that women and men are entitled to equal treatment
by the state notwithstanding their inherent biological and social differences.
Although it has not thus far, Virginia might symbolically represent, for
gay rights advocacy, and perhaps eventually for a gay rights jurisprudence,
the possibility of recognizing difference, whether inherent or not, along the
axis of sexuality as well as along the axis of sex. Indeed, Virginia’s implicit
understanding that “similarly situated” need not mean identical in all respects
in order to translate into equal treatment by the state might encourage gay
advocates to advance legal arguments that recognize, and perhaps even
celebrate, the sort of sexual differences that make sexual minorities, the
relationships into which they enter, and the families that they raise unique.
Moreover, Virginia’s mandate of equal treatment notwithstanding sex
differences might one day translate into a sexuality jurisprudence that is
equally accepting of what Professor William Eskridge has referred to as
“benign sexual variation” 267 as it now is of sex/gender difference.

V. THE NORMATIVE VALUE OF VIRGINIA’S VISION OF DIFFERENCE
The objective of this Essay’s previous Parts was to show that the idea of
same-sex marriage continues to be informed by a no-differences model by
both the legal community and the public more generally, despite the fact that
scientists have concluded that differences between same-sex and cross-sex
relationships exist, and despite the fact that a model for incorporating the
reality of that difference into a legal argument exists—namely, the model
offered by the author of United States v. Virginia’s majority opinion, Justice
267 William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion,
Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106
YALE L.J. 2411, 2412 (1997).
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Ginsburg, for whom that decision is considered to be one that “she had hoped
the Court would one day arrive at when she first started arguing cases of
[sex] discrimination in the 1960s.” 268 Having thus elucidated the nodifferences model, discussed its shortcomings, and offered an alternative
model that draws force from Justice Ginsburg’s landmark sex equality
opinion, this Part will now turn to a brief consideration of why gay advocates
should embrace the sexual differences equality model that Virginia at least
theoretically offers. While those reasons are many, this Part will focus on
three.
First, and as discussed earlier, gay advocates should not have to sacrifice
factual/descriptive accuracy in exchange for equal treatment. As Stacey and
Biblarz nicely put it, “the case for granting equal rights to nonheterosexual
parents should not require finding their children to be identical to those
reared by heterosexuals.” 269 The same could be said of the depictions of
same-sex relationships that emerge from the legal arguments in marriage
equality litigation, namely, that they should not have to look like a same-sex
replica of what society imagines a heterosexual relationship to look like.
Legal equality, in other words, should not demand that advocates under
represent, if not completely ignore, the differences that actually exist
between same-sex and cross-sex relationships and between the families of
gays and those of straights. To the extent that the author of Virginia’s
majority opinion embraces sex equality in the face of sex difference both in
that opinion and outside of it, she offers the possibility for gay advocates to
argue that courts considering the equality claims of sexual minorities,
whether in the marriage context or otherwise, should do the same. Moreover,
to the extent that commentators and marriage equality advocates alike are
interested in making “claims that are not only useful but truthful,” 270 it
would seem that Virginia offers them a strong possibility for making
descriptive/factual arguments that are both accurate and have robust
antecedents in the Supreme Court’s equality jurisprudence.
Second, recognizing the differences, inherent or not, between same-sex
and cross-sex relationships and between the families of gays and those of
straights in marriage equality litigation promotes something that the nodifferences model woefully fails to: an ethic of cultural pluralism, diversity,
and “benign” heterogeneity. 271 Insofar as our society values diversity in its
manifold forms—including racial, religious, sex/gender, and sexuality
diversity—we should not hesitate to demand that our legal system do the
268 SALOMONE, supra note 10, at 165 (remarks of Mark Tushnet, then Dean of the

Georgetown University Law Center).
269 Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 116, at 178.
270 Rosky, supra note 176, at 348.
271 Eskridge, supra note 267, at 2412.
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same. Effectively forcing marriage equality litigants to succumb to the
mathematical fallacy in order to secure equal treatment by the state sends the
message that the law values assimilation over difference and homogeneity
over heterogeneity when it comes to the equality claims of sexual minorities,
where it might be much more tolerant of such difference and heterogeneity in
other areas (e.g., religion, gender). To the extent that Justice Ginsburg’s
Virginia opinion in part disrupts the symmetrical equality model and the
mathematical fallacy on which it rests vis-à-vis sex equality, it offers the
possibility for gay advocates and courts alike to make and to embrace
arguments that similarly disrupt the symmetrical equality model vis-à-vis
sexual equality, and, in the process, to offer the law “a more genuinely
pluralist approach to family diversity” 272 than the current marriage equality
strategies allow for.
Third and last, acknowledging the differences between same-sex and
cross-sex relationships and between the families of gays and those of
straights in marriage/sexual equality litigation could result in an image of
marriage that is more appealing to those progressives who have faulted the
marriage equality movement for being decidedly conservative and
unapologetically “imitative” of heterosexual norms and practices. 273 Indeed,
progressive commentators have long criticized the marriage movement for
projecting an image of marriage that “replicates the heterosexual one, rather
than challenging or altering it,” 274 and for failing to “validate the
differentness of lesbians and gay men.” 275 Perhaps most notable among them
is Michael Warner, who has excoriated the movement for its “rhetoric of
normalization,” 276 its “mainstreaming project,” 277 and its tendency to lapse
into “regressive narratives of progress” 278 —all of which are vividly captured
in the “regressive” photography that accompanied Denizet-Lewis’s New York
Times Magazine feature, predicated as it was on visual like-straight reasoning
and its no-differences logic. Interestingly, the progressive claim that the
272 Stacey and Biblarz, supra note 116, at 164.
273 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
274 Walters, supra note 25, at 54.
275 Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW &

SEXUALITY 9, 12 n.9 (1991) (discussing Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Was Marriage a
Path To Liberation?, 6 OUT/LOOK, NAT’L LESBIAN & GAY Q. 8 (1989)). Hunter rightly
observes that as of 1991 “[a]nalogous tensions between equality-based strategies and
difference-based strategies have buffeted feminist theory for the last decade.” Hunter,
supra, at 12.
276 MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 60 (1999).
277 Id. at 146.
278 Id. at 134.
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movement for same-sex marriage merely mimics a heterosexual paradigm
echoes the radical feminist claim, made not too long ago, that a sex equality
movement predicated on a symmetrical equality model merely creates an
undesirable situation where “women ape men.” 279
That both legal and visual discourse about same-sex marriage has had the
power to produce an image of that relationship that is profoundly
heterosexual and profoundly regressive is something that this Essay has
explored in relative depth. In addition, that the legal arguments that
advocates deploy can have as profound an impact on the law as do the legal
rules that flow from those arguments is something that Professor Nan Hunter
elucidated nearly twenty years ago, when she elegantly observed that:
The impact of law often lies as much in the body of discourse created in the
process of its adoption as in the final legal rule itself. What a new legal rule
is popularly understood to signify may dtermine [sic] more of its potential
for social change than the particulars of the change in the law. The social
meaning of the legalization of lesbian and gay marriage, for example, would
be enormously different if legalization resulted from political efforts framed
as ending gendered roles between spouses rather than if it were the outcome
of a campaign valorizing the institution of marriage, even if the ultimate
“holding” is the same. Similarly, the meaning of securing for lesbians and
gay men the right to adopt or to raise children is vastly different if
understood as reflecting the equal worth of lesbian, gay, and heterosexual
role models, rather than as justified by the view that a parent’s sexual
orientation has no impact on, and thus poses no danger to, the sexual
orientation of a child. 280

In other words, how we frame our legal arguments matters. Framing
same-sex marriage as but a same-sex version of its cross-sex counterpart not
only advances a thin vision of cultural pluralism and family diversity and
alienates those who might otherwise be more sympathetic to the idea of a gay
marriage movement, but also fails to change the social meaning of marriage,
“even if the ultimate ‘holding’”—marriage for gays and straights alike—“is
the same.” 281
Now, this Essay does not suggest that gay advocates could easily rely on
Justice Ginsburg’s Virginia opinion in support of the proposition that the law
should recognize gay marriage because it will transform the institution and
alter its social, gendered meaning. Indeed, quite the contrary, as Justice
Ginsburg strongly suggests that admitting women into VMI will not change
that institution all that much (even if it will change it a little) because at least
279 GERMAINE GREER, THE FEMALE EUNUCH 353 (1970).
280 Hunter, supra note 275, at 29.
281 Id.
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“some women,” despite their inherent differences, can satisfy the physical
and psychological demands that render VMI special. 282 What it does suggest,
though, is that gay advocates can turn to her landmark sex equality opinion in
support of the proposition that the law should recognize gay marriage despite
(or perhaps even because of) its differences. At the very least, Virginia, as
well as its author’s more recent remarks on the reality of gender difference,
offer the opportunity of even having a conversation about incorporating the
idea of difference into the “body of discourse” on which gay advocates could
and should rely to change legal rules and secure equal treatment, a
conversation that the sheer pervasiveness of the no-differences model and its
assimilative logic has left little, if any, room to have. 283

VI. CONCLUSION
The objective of this Essay has been to construct an argument why
United States v. Virginia, an opinion that some consider to be a (if not the)
highpoint of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s pioneering work on gender
equality, deserves as revered a place in the law and sexuality canon as it
currently enjoys in the law and gender canon. More narrowly, and in the
process of doing just that, this Essay also aimed to challenge the contention
that Virginia—and, in particular, its famed “inherent differences” passage—
supports exclusionary marriage laws insofar as that passage both recognizes
and respects the very differences on which those laws ostensibly rest. If even
the Supreme Court’s champion of gender equality has recognized both that
inherent differences between the sexes exist and that a community of one sex
is different from a community of both, or so the traditionalist marriage
argument goes, then surely it is not irrational for states to do the same by
limiting marriage to a relationship between “inherently different” women and
men.
As this Essay has shown, however, that argument seriously misreads
what Virginia in fact says and stands for: that while gender difference
(biological, social) might very well exist, difference alone is an insufficient
reason to deny individuals equal treatment and equal opportunity under the
law. To the extent that exclusionary marriage laws rest on a justificatory
logic that is rooted in the idea of gender difference, they deny both equal
treatment and equal opportunity to those who desire to formalize their
relationship through marriage. Indeed, it is no doubt perverse to invoke the
words of the one Justice on the Court who has been a “thoughtful advocate
282 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996).
283 On the assimilative demands that United States equality law places on
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for gender equality throughout her career” 284 in support of laws that deny
sexuality equality precisely because of gender difference.
This Essay draws to a close by citing to one of the amicus briefs filed in
Iowa’s marriage equality case, Varnum v. Brien, and authored by one of the
participants in this wonderful symposium, Professor Tobias Wolff. That brief
cites to Virginia in a way that this author hopes will catch on in the years to
come, as plaintiffs and their advocates continue to challenge the
constitutionality of all laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual
preference, including, but surely not limited to, marriage prohibitions. It
concludes by reminding the Supreme Court of Iowa that sex-based difference
is something that the Supreme Court has already embraced in Virginia, thus
setting a precedent for courts to do the same with respect to sexual
orientation-based difference. “Just as we celebrate the differences between
the genders,” the brief observes, “so we can recognize and celebrate the
different experiences that same-sex and opposite-sex relationships contribute
to the . . . tapestry of our community.” 285 In her gender equality
jurisprudence as in her more recent public observations, Justice Ginsburg
nicely recognizes the ways in which sex-based difference can make a
difference, “contribut[ing] to the . . . tapestry” 286 of many a community,
including educational institutions, juries, and the Supreme Court itself.
Advocates for sexuality equality would do well to follow her lead.

284 Kmiec, supra note 250, at 656 n.6.
285 Brief of Amici Curiae OneIowa, supra note 244, at 25.
286 Id.

